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Abstract 
What role do state and non-state actors play in the in the negotiation process on the 
protection of human rights in the Southeast Asian region? Is there an interaction 
between both types of players or is the ASEM Dialogue still dominated by state parties? 
And does the discussion of human rights within the ASEM Dialogue actually lead to 
more protection of these rights within the region of Southeast Asia? 
 
These are the research questions I have tried to answer in this paper on the ASEM 
Dialogue as an example of multilateral, international negotiation. Human rights are a 
controversial issue and have caused a sometimes troublesome relation between the 
European and East Asia continents. The case of Burma/Myanmar is a clear example in 
which both sides were, more or less, clear opponents. The reason for this is that the East 
Asian states have tried to keep the issue of human rights off the official ASEM agenda, 
while the European states were in favour of dealing with the issue in the Summits. Non-
state actors, like non-governmental organisations have held parallel sessions on general 
issues on the ASEM agenda, but have also organised specific meetings on human rights 
issues. Asian states have tried to prevent these parallel sessions from taking place, and 
have limited the possible role of non-governmental organisations in general, using a 
similar argument as for preventing the human rights dialogue. Despite these restraints, a 
slow increase in the role that NGOs can play in the region is occurring. The ASEM 
Summit can function as a legitimization for these non-state actors to increase their 
influence. And the European states should use this trend to get the issue of human rights 
discussed during the Summits, by letting the NGOs lobby for it. Through this 
interaction with European states, NGOs can increase their effectiveness and hopefully 
increase the level of human rights protection. 
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The Interaction between State and Non-state Actors  
The Role of Human Rights within the ASEM Dialogue 
Simone Eysink 
 
Introduction 
 
On 26 July 2005, the Burmese military junta decided to abandon the option to become 
the president of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2006, which 
would have consequences for the presiding and hosting of international discussion fora 
like the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asian Europe Meeting (ASEM). With 
this decision, it prevented a diplomatic disturbance from exploding and destroying the 
relation between the (South) East Asian nations and their European and American 
counterparts. The Americans stated that they would boycott the next meeting of ARF if 
Burma/Myanmar would preside ASEAN. Moreover, several member states of the 
European Union declared themselves to be against the participation of Burma/Myanmar 
in the Summits of ASEM, which are an example of the process of multilateral 
negotiation attended by the heads of state and government of the participating states 
from Europe and East Asia. This issue was disturbing the relation between both 
continents from the moment the Southeast Asian country was adopted in the association 
of ASEAN in 1997. This matter is not permanently resolved by the above described 
decision of Burma/Myanmar, though. 
 
The issue that was at stake here is the regime of the military junta of Burma/Myanmar, 
which seized power through a violent coupe, and which is known for the violation of 
fundamental human rights. The junta is ruling since 1988, restricting various civil and 
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political rights, controlling public and private life of the population entirely, resulting in 
the economic and political exhaustion of the country. The issue of the violent regime of 
Burma/Myanmar and the problems involving its participation in the ASEM Dialogue is 
just an example case of the troublesome relation between the member states of the 
European Union and the countries in East Asia regarding the controversial issue of 
human rights. Apparently, both regions have a different understanding of the issue, the 
contents, the consequences and the realization. This has lead to a difficult relation in the 
past, especially at the negotiation table. The Asian states often try to keep the Dialogue 
focused on economic and more non-controversial political issues, while their European 
counterparts have tried to insert the issue of human rights. The reason for the latter to do 
so is that most European states consider the level of human rights protection, which is a 
universal obligation according to them, to be somewhat diminutive in the region of 
Southeast Asia.1 But has the fact that the European states try to put the issue of human 
rights on the agenda of the dialogue increased the level of protection in the region of 
their Southeast Asian counterparts? And what role do non-state actors play in improving 
the level of human rights protection through multilateral negotiations? In other words: 
what role do state and non-state actors play in the negotiation process on the protection 
of human rights in the Southeast Asian region, in particular regarding the example case 
of Burma/Myanmar? 
 
In order to answer this question, the process of multilateral negotiations and the 
interaction between state and non-state actors in this matter will be analyzed, applying 
this theoretical literature to the ASEM Dialogue in general and to the issue of human 
rights in specific. Then, the third chapter continues with a discussion of the role of non-
state actors, especially non-governmental organizations, in the protection of human 
rights in general, and applied to the region of Southeast Asia. Finally, the analysis of 
multilateral negotiations, the role of states and NGOs in human rights protection and the 
functioning of the ASEM Dialogue regarding human rights is applied to the matter of 
participation of Burma/Myanmar, followed by several concluding remarks. 
                                                 
1
 The reason why the focal area is limited to Southeast Asia is the fact that this region is easy to define, 
because of the functioning of ASEAN in this part of the Asian continent. Besides, the member states of 
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1. Multilateral negotiations: the role of state and non-state actors 
 
A. The complex process of international multilateral negotiations 
 
The traditional vision on the international negotiation process is one of a collection of 
various situations in which sovereign parties come together to come to a desirable 
solution.2 The process of the negotiation, and its complexity, is coloured by the amount 
of parties participating in the finding of a solution. Before considering the amount of 
parties in the process though, it is important to define the concept of “party”. According 
to Larry Crump and Ian Glendon in their article on the complexity of multiparty 
negotiation, a party is a participant in a conflict, who has the authority to take a decision 
or decisions and who is able to communicate such decisions.3 Both aspects are 
intertwined and are important to distinct a party from for instance an agent or a 
negotiator. The latter are instruments through which the negotiation process can take 
place, but who are not a participant in a conflict and who are, in their own capacity, not 
able to take decisions.  
 
Coming to the issue of the amount of parties to an international negotiation process, 
there is an important distinction to make between multilateral and bilateral processes. 
The term multilateral refers to a negotiation to which three or more sides are connected, 
while bilateral refers to a two-sided structure. Fen Osler Hampson compared 
multilateral negotiations is his book with “coalition-building enterprises involving 
                                                                                                                                               
ASEAN form an important part of the Asian part of the ASEM Dialogue, and they established a form of 
multilateral negotiation with their EU counterparts as early as 1972.  
2
 V. A. Kremenyuk, The emerging system of international negotiation, in: V.A. Kremenyuk (ed.), 
Intrenational Negotiation; Analysis, approaches, issues, San Fransisco: John Wiley and Sons, 2002, p.22 
3
 L. Crump, A.I. Glendon, Towards a Paradigm of Multiparty Negotiation, in: International Negotiation, 
volume 8, issue 2, September 2003, p.198 
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states, non-state actors, and international organizations”.4 This definition shows already 
that there are different kinds of parties and these parties have a certain relation to each 
other. In the case of multilateral negotiations, as compared to the bilateral type, the 
relations are rather complex. Besides the primary parties involved, there can be third 
parties, not directly participating in the conflict but with a certain interest in the issues at 
stake. In the traditional view of multilateral negotiations, state parties are the main 
actors, since they have the decision power and are the ones presenting the outcome to 
their rank and file. This narrow view, however, is no longer valid in the rapidly 
globalizing world. One of the main characteristics of globalization is that states have 
become interdependent and in order to structure this interdependency, international 
organizations are created. Besides these international organizations, multinational 
corporations, interests groups, academics, parliamentarians, etc. play a growing role in 
influencing policy and thus the international negotiation processes.5 These other, non-
state actors can become a third party in such a process, influencing the outcome by 
forming coalitions with the state parties involved. Or they become even a primary party, 
when they have a clear interest in the issue at stake. Since the end of the Second World 
War, the amount of these non-state actors has grown rapidly. There are permanent 
international institutions that deal with international issues of various nature such as the 
United Nations. Besides, there are permanent international negotiation fora that deal 
with specific international topics, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Besides, there are regional organisations, 
dealing with issues concerning the specific region, such as the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the European Union (EU). 
 
There is almost a direct relation between the amount of parties in a negotiation process, 
both state and non-state, and the possibility of reaching an agreement. The conclusion 
that the higher the amount of parties, the lower the possibility that an actual agreement 
will be reached is valid as long as the large amount of parties also results in a large 
amount of different interests. Besides, there is a difference in bargaining power between 
                                                 
4
 Fen Osler Hampson, M. Hart, Multilateral negotiations; Lessons from arms control, trade, and the 
environment, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, p.24 
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the parties: large states for instance have more bargaining power than small states and 
state parties usually have more influence than interest groups. This power difference is 
cause for the complexity of multilateral negotiations as well. The complexity is fuelled 
by the difficulties in communication between the parties involved. The more parties are 
participating in the process, the more difficult it will be to interpret the verbal and non-
verbal forms of communication. This latter aspect is strongly influenced by cultural 
differences between parties though. The more parties there are to a negotiation process, 
the more these cultural differences could stand in the way of reaching an agreement. 
These differences in culture can thus refer to the differences in behaviour during the 
negotiation process, but also to the differences in position on certain issues, which 
brings us back to the issue of heterogeneity of the interests in multilateral negotiation 
processes. In the case of the negotiation between the European Union member states 
and their Asian counterparts in the ASEM Dialogue, the issue of human rights clearly 
shows this difference of opinion caused by varying cultural interpretations of the issue. 
While the European states tend to put emphasis on the protection of the rights of the 
individual, for instance, the Asian states rather think of the rights of the community as a 
whole. The justification for this position is that Asian culture is more collectively based, 
while the Western cultures are more focussed on the individual. The issue of cultural 
values in international negotiations is certainly interesting, but goes at this point beyond 
the scope of this paper. The question that also arises here, and which will be dealt with 
later on, is how far this cultural interpretation of human rights is legitimate, in the light 
of the agreed universality of the rights posed. In this case, it is hard to find a bridge for 
this cultural difference. 
  
One way of structuring the complexity of multilateral negotiations is through coalition 
building. A coalition can be defined as “the unification of the power or resources (or 
both) of two or more parties so that they stand a better chance of obtaining a desired 
outcome or of controlling others not included in the coalition.”6 Coalitions are an 
interesting option for parties that have a weak bargaining power. For them, the costs of 
                                                                                                                                               
5
 G. Sjöstedt, Empowerment of developing countries in international talks; A strategy to make global 
regimes more effective, in: PIN Points, Network Newsletter, volume 24, 2005, p.10 
6
 Fen Osler Hampson, M. Hart, 1995, p.29 
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forming a coalition are lower than maintaining its individual membership to the 
negotiation. A coalition is only effective if it increases each member’s share of the 
negotiated outcome.7 In order to form a coalition, a process of hard bargaining must be 
followed in order to reach a common position, which might lead to a rather inflexible 
disposition of the coalition in the general negotiation. This stubbornness may also be 
caused by fixed ideologies and principles that are the basis of the coalition.8 Reluctance 
to leave these principles causes the inflexibility and can lead to less possibility to reach 
an agreement, which is actually the opposite of the desired result. 
 
Coalitions do not have to be fixed indefinitely though. It is possible that within an 
already established coalition, parties cooperate on some issues, but disagree on some 
other. But even within a single party, it is possible that there is an internal dispute. This 
was the case for instance in the position of the U.S. government regarding the treatment 
of, again, Burma/Myanmar. As for its policy on the sanctions imposed on the country, 
the Bush administration was quite clear. However, when it came to the diplomatic 
pressure to be used to persuade the military junta in Rangoon to start the diplomatic 
process of reform, the government in Washington had more trouble in defining its 
position.9 Taking this a step further, single entities can develop into a bilateral 
negotiation or even a multilateral negotiation, in the worst case scenario.10 This 
scenario, however, will not occur in the case of states so quickly. 
 
In order for coalitions to be effective and for managing and structuring the complexity 
of the multilateral negotiation processes the role of the leaders in the negotiation process 
is crucial. Since after the Second World War, more international actors have entered the 
                                                 
7
 Idem. 
8
 One result of this stubbornness could be the fact that all parties remain in war with each other. The 
stubbornness itself is a result of too much back-wards looking to find solution. In order to break this 
spiral, a mediator could provide the parties with new, forward-looking insights. See also I. W. Zartman, 
Looking forward and looking backward on negotiation theory, in: I.W. Zartman, V. Kremenyuk (eds.), 
Peace versus justice; Negotiating forward- and backward-looking outcomes, Lanham: Rowman& 
Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2005, p.295 
9
 T. Malinowski, Human rights and U.S. strategy in Burma; Testimony by Tom Malinowski, Washington 
Advocacy Director, on: Human Rights Watch, Human Rights news, 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/03/25/usint8228.htm 
10
 L. Crump, A.I. Glendon, 2003, p.201 
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battlefield, and the interests at stake have become more intertwined, the negotiation 
processes have become less effective. The agreements are often criticized for their 
weakness and their time consuming nature.11 This was certainly the case in the solution 
chosen in the case of the participation of Burma/Myanmar to the Fifth ASEM Summit, 
as will be described later as an example case. Strong leadership is crucial for reaching 
the desired outcome in such complex situations. The leadership of The Netherlands as 
the Presidency of the EU at that moment played an important role, but was not powerful 
enough to reach one common view amongst the European states, which resulted in a 
rather weak compromise on the issue of the participation of Burma/Myanmar with the 
Asian states. While the relationship between leadership and managing the complexity of 
the multilateral negotiation process is still an area open for study, it is clear that 
leadership in this respect requires certain qualifications for the complexity to be brought 
back to manageable proportions. Some important functions of leadership in a 
negotiation process are: agenda setting; creating awareness for the issues at stake; 
creating solutions for (deadlocked) situations; and making deals.12 These functions 
require, besides the skills to create these solutions and to negotiate deals, 
communicative skills as well. Solutions cannot be found unless the interests and 
differences are well communicated. Then, the solution has to be explained to the parties 
involved. The same goes for the creation of deals. The whole negotiation process is 
about active communication, both verbal and non-verbal. Leadership requires a good 
eye for both.  
 
B. The ability of non-state actors to influence the outcome of the negotiations 
 
As has been said above, the arena of international negotiation processes has been 
broadened beyond the scope of state parties to include non-state actors such as civil 
society: non-governmental organisations (NGOs)13, individual parliamentarians, 
                                                 
11
 V.A, Kremenyuk, 2002, p.28 
12
 Fen Osler Hampson, M. Hart, 1995, p.43 
13
 Non-governmental organizations can be defined as “non-profit making, non-violent organizations, 
which do not represent governments or states”. See: C. Albin, Can NGOs enhance the effectiveness of 
international negotiation?, in: International Negotiation, volume 4, issue 3, March 1999, p.373 
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multinationals, etc. Civil society is a rather broad term, used freely by many, but 
explained by only a few. Michael Walzer defined the term in his book on global civil 
society as “the space of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational 
networks – formed for the sake of family, faith, interest, and ideology – that fill this 
space.14 This form of human association is often regarded as a counter weight of the 
state, since in the former association – a state is a form of association as well, if you 
regard the philosophical theories of Hobbes and Rousseau for instance – lacks the 
element of coercion. In civil society, according to the definition of Walzer, people are 
related to each other on the basis of free will.15 According to him, this is the preferred 
way to lead a good life: in freedom, committed to the common cause and involved in 
decision-making, which argumentation goes back to the Greeks.16 This concept of civil 
society and good life can be criticized by the argument that this is a rather 
individualistic, Western ideology, despite the element of commitment to the common 
cause. The individual is the centre and starting point of the theory. In Asian and African 
societies, however, individuals are subordinated to the community, which changes the 
concept of the good life as well: a person leads a good life when he or she sacrifices him 
or herself for the sake of the community. In this view, the community is the starting 
point. In these societies, the state is more paternalistically oriented, at least in the case of 
several of the Southeast Asian states.17 One element that is valid, despite the differing 
views on the fulfillment of the state and despite the different theories and definitions of 
the concept of civil society,18 is the fact that the existence of civil society, as 
counterweight for the government, with its added values and ideologies, is fundamental 
for the good functioning of the state, also in respect of the protection of human rights. 
The main aim of civil society is to try to influence and improve society as a whole, and 
                                                 
14
 M. Walzer, The concept of civil society, in: M. Walzer (ed.), Towards a global civil society, 
Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995, p.7 
15
 But it can be argued that a state is an association based on free will as well. Individuals seek the 
protection of statehood, since their autonomy will be in danger if there is no such protective sovereign 
power. Yet, once the state is established the individual is not as free as it is in civil society. 
16
 Idem., p.9 
17
 S. Eysink, ASEAN en mensenrechten; Feit of fictie?, in: Internationale Spectator, volume 59, July-
August 2005, p.436 
18
 The philosopher Talcott Parsons, for instance, who based this theory of civil society and the state on the 
theories of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, distinguishes the societal community from the economy, the 
polity and the cultural sphere. He puts emphasis on social integration, solidarity and the community. The 
philosopher Antonio Gramsci, however, like many other neo-Marxist writers, does not make the 
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doing so by not being part of the governmental or business sector.19 The fact that in 
Burma/Myanmar civil society has a difficulty to express its critical voice, because of 
heavy suppression by Burmese laws, is one of the signs that democracy is not exactly 
flourishing and human rights are violated by the military regime. The country lacks a 
counterweight to the government.20 From the inside of the country, there is no critical 
view on the actions of the Rangoon regime, simply because these critical voices are 
suppressed, because civil society is suppressed. 
 
As regards to human rights protection, especially NGOs, as an important part of civil 
society, can make an important contribution, and therefore focus will be on their role in 
the negotiation process.21 In international negotiations, the role of NGOs has grown 
rapidly. According to some traditionalists, as was described before, state parties should 
and still do dominate the international negotiation arena and should continue to do so. 
NGOs are regarded by some of them as “narrowly based interest groups”.22 These ideas, 
however, do no longer correspond with reality. In the United Nations, for instance, their 
importance was recognized by the former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 
referring to the organisations as “full participants” in the international arena.23 NGOs 
have been admitted to the forum of UN organs like ECOSOC, because by the public 
expression of their views, based on the high level of technical knowledge, they added to 
the effectiveness and democratic level of the negotiations and decision making 
processes of those bodies. Besides, their participation could increase the public 
awareness of and support for the entire UN system. On a regional level, within the 
                                                                                                                                               
distinction between civil society and economy. See for these and other theories on civil society J.L. 
Cohen, A. Arato, Civil society and political theory, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992 
19
 L. Jorgensen, What are NGOs doing in civil society?, in: A. Clayton (ed.), NGOs, civil society and the 
state: building democracy in transitional societies, Oxford: INTRAC, 1996, p.36 
20
 These Burmese laws forbid the people from forming independent organizations or even from holding 
meeting of more than five people. Communities and individuals are not allowed to organize actions to 
deal with the poor economic situation caused by the policy of the regime. There is no freedom of the 
press and there are no government agencies that can respond to the humanitarian needs of the people. See: 
T. Malinowski, 2004, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/03/25/usint8228.htm 
21
 L. Jorgensen, in: A. Clayton (ed.), 1996, p.36 
22
 C. Albin, in: International Negotiation, March 1999, p.372 
23
 Idem., p.371 
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European Union, actors such as interest groups, researchers, and other non-state actors 
fulfil a crucial role in problem solving as well.24  
 
These arguments in favour of NGO participation in negotiation processes are not only 
valid for the United Nations or EU system. These functions fulfilled by NGOs could be 
fulfilled in other fora, such as the ASEM Dialogue as well. One main difference in this 
regard is, however, that within the UN system NGOs are officially recognized by the 
Charter and by several ECOSOC Resolutions, providing them with consultative status.25 
This status includes official representation of the NGOs at the fora, the possibility to 
hand in written statements and the option to place items on the agenda. In the case of 
ASEM, NGOs are, however, not recognized as official participants. While NGOs also 
fulfil their role in the EU, Asian countries tend to be more hesitant when it comes to 
NGO participation. Vietnam, for instance, forcefully tried to prevent the parallel NGO 
forum to the Fifth ASEM Summit in Hanoi of 2004 to take place. The same was done 
by the Thai government when hosting the first Summit in 1996. The role of NGOs in 
the ASEAN region and with respect to the ASEM process will elaborated upon later. 
 
Effectiveness of NGOs 
 
ASEM is not the only forum, however, that does not officially recognize the status and 
participation of the NGOs. Their participation, besides in the well developed or 
structured organisations or fora like the United Nations, the EU or the WTO, remains 
unofficial, ad hoc or subjected to the interests of the state parties involved. The question 
that arises here, is what the effectiveness of NGO participation can be in these 
circumstances. Two important factors that influence the effectiveness of the NGOs is 
their size and their recognition by state actors. Taking the example of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), this organisation is recognized as an important 
                                                 
24
 C. Jonsson, B. Bjurulf, O. Elgstrom, A. Sannerstedt, M. Stromvik, Negotiations in networks in the 
European Union, in: International Negotiation, volume 3, issue 3, March 1998, p.322, 323 
25
 Resp. article 71 of the UN Charter and ECOSOC Resolutions 3 (II) of June 1946, 1099 (XL) of March 
1966, 1296 (XLIV) of May 1968 
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player in the field of humanitarian law making. Considering for instance the 
development process of the Convention banning anti-personnel landmines, the ICRC 
was the initiator and played an important part in the final realisation.26 Besides, the 
ICRC played a crucial role in the “failure” of the negotiation process on the creation of 
the UN Development Relief Organisation UNDRO in the 1970s. Since the Red Cross 
had serious objections against the creation of such a coordinating body, it used its 
influencing power to affect the Soviet Union and France, who were finally more 
strongly opposed to UNDRO’s creation. The result was that UNDRO was established 
but with a weak mandate.27  
 
A result of the widespread recognition of ICRC’s international status is that it also 
enjoys a large amount of public funding. Most of these funding come from state parties. 
This does not mean, however, that this automatically affects its independency. ICRC, as 
such a big player in the international arena is able to maintain its critical view on states’ 
policies towards humanitarian issues. For smaller organisations, however, this could be 
difficult. Therefore, these NGOs could decide not to accept any financial means 
provided by states, in order to maintain their independence, and thus their freedom of 
action.28 This is also true for organisations that have a rather confrontational way of 
action towards criticizing state policies. A good example is Greenpeace in its campaign 
against for instance ocean dumping. Despite the fact that it is a large environmental 
organisation, it is still struggling with its resources and the fact that it cannot be 
represented everywhere at any time.29 
 
Besides the factors that are closely related to the NGOs themselves, there are other, 
more external factors that can influence their effectiveness as well. One of these is the 
overlap between the agendas of the states and the NGOs. In general, the bigger the 
                                                 
26
 N. Short, The role of NGOs in the Ottawa process to ban landmines, in: International Negotiation, 
volume 4, issue 3, March 1999 
27
 R. Kent, The United Nations: a suitable place for disasters?, in: P. Taylor en A. Groom (eds), 
International Institutions at Work, London: Pinter, 1987, p.135 
28
 C. Albin, in: International Negotiation, March 1999, p.376 
29
 R. Parmentier, Greenpeace and the dumping of waste at sea: a case of non-state actors’ intervention in 
international affairs, in: International Negotiation, volume 4, issue 3, March 1999, p.449 
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overlap, the more interests the state parties have in involving the organisations in the 
process and the more willing they are to regulate the NGO participation better. It is 
usually the middle sized states that can benefit from the input and influence of NGOs by 
forming coalitions with them for instance. In the case of the creation of the International 
Criminal Court the NGOs were used by these states in favour of the creation of the 
Court as instruments to keep the process under international attention and to maintain 
public support for the idea.30  The coalition that was eventually formed between the 
states in favour of the creation of the Court and the NGOs was strong enough to 
overrule the influence of for instance a Super Power like the United States. This had 
much to do with the seize and diversity of the coalition: these two factors showed the 
broad public basis for the establishment of the judicial body.31  
 
The involvement of NGOs grows also in negotiations on rather complex, technical 
issues, in which the state parties can use the knowledge of the particular organisations to 
ground their positions and arguments. This could be the case in for example legal issues, 
in which the International Commission of Jurists could play a role.  
 
Functions of NGOs 
 
Discussing the factors that influence the effectiveness of NGO participation in 
international negotiations is closely linked to the different functions that NGOs can 
fulfil in these processes. Cecilia Albin recognizes in her article in International 
Negotiation seven main activities that the organisations can perform, both formally and 
informally: definition of problems and the setting of goals and agendas; norm and 
principle enforcement; provision of expertise and information; public advocacy and 
mobilization; lobbying; direct participation in the establishment of agreements; 
compliance related activities such as monitoring and assistance.32 
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The function of agenda and goal setting could be considered as one of the main tasks of 
NGOs, and one of the most powerful ones. The way the goals and agenda are set has 
consequences for the final outcome of the negotiation. As has been said above, in the 
case of the creation of the International Criminal Court, the NGOs were used by states 
as instruments to keep the issue on the international agenda. However, NGOs can use 
their own influence to make sure that a certain topic is discussed in the relevant 
international forum, and that thereby the political atmosphere for action in that 
particular field is created. The ICRC, for instance, took the initiative to come to a treaty 
on the ban on landmines. Besides, Amnesty International undertook a two year 
campaign against torture in the early 1970s, which eventually lead to attention of the 
United Nations on the matter. This resulted in the adoption of a Declaration against 
Torture, the appointment of a UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, and finally, the 
adoption of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment in February 1985.33  
 
But NGOs did not only play a role in the agenda setting of the issue of torture. They 
participated heavily in the standard setting procedure as well, as was also the case in the 
drafting of the Convention to ban anti-personnel mines and even in drafting of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights.34 Especially the role of Amnesty International 
in the process of international human rights norm setting is considered to be crucial. 
Lobbying is in principle the most effective means for NGOs to provide their input in the 
standard setting phase. The lobbying process starts with providing a legal or technical 
study on the matter to the state parties involved. Through these studies, which involve 
the NGOs’ own interpretation of the material, and which can include possible 
suggestions for improvements, the state parties can be influenced already. However, in 
order to achieve significant political change as well, it is important that the public is 
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well informed and demands this change.35 This is especially the case for NGOs working 
in the field of development aid, environmental issues, etc, and not so much for NGOs 
working in the field of legal standard setting. But these latter organisations could be a 
link in the chain to eventually mobilize the public. This mobilization is essential for the 
NGO strategy of so-called “naming and shaming”: especially in the areas of 
environmental, humanitarian and human rights issues, non-state actors can use the 
reputation of the state as a means to put pressure on it. This was the case with the 
adoption of the Rome Statute for the establishment of the ICC.36 The strategy is not 
effective without the involvement of the public and it is not effective without the 
independence of the organisations.  
 
Once agreements have been reached, either in the form of norm setting or otherwise, 
NGOs can play a role in enforcement and monitoring of the norms. In the area of human 
rights protection, there are several NGOs that monitor the states’ compliance with the 
UN treaties on the protection of human rights, through fact-finding missions, shadow 
reports, statements, etc.37 Publicity is an important factor in this regard, as is 
maintaining the dialogue with the states involved.  
 
NGO participation and the effectiveness of this participation is growing. It is widely 
agreed that states are no longer the only actors in the international arena. Non-state 
actors, together forming civil society as a counterweight for the government’s power, 
have been able to successfully set the international agenda’s on various issues. The 
problems they are facing, however, in the execution of their tasks is that the 
effectiveness of their participation and their ability to influence state policies are still 
dependent on the states’ willingness to allow them to be present at the official and 
unofficial negotiation meetings. Overlap in interests increases the chance that they will 
be able to attend, which could be difficult for the more controversial, confronting 
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organisations. But these latter organisations have an important monitoring role to fulfil 
as well.  
 
Another problematic factor could be the lack of funding, and thus staff, to function on a 
national or international level in stead of only in the local field. Therefore, the most 
effective NGOs are usually the well-funded and well-connected ones, which have 
usually gained an official status. This leaves a whole arena of local, unrecognized 
NGOs aside, which are of crucial importance for the people living in these local areas.  
However, some NGOs consciously chose not to give up their unofficial status, fearing 
this will be harmful for their independence.  
 
In this sense coalition building is the key word for increasing the influence of NGOs. 
Entering into a coalition with states, which are usually middle-size in terms of power, 
can actually be a very powerful strategy for gain the desired result, of which the 
negotiations for the creation of the International Criminal Court remains the best 
example. Large and diverse coalitions can increase the effectiveness of the naming and 
shaming strategy, since state parties tend to be very sensitive towards public opinion. 
For them it is better to be on the “good” side, meaning the side with the growing 
international support than in the situation of further isolation. This sensitivity can be 
used by NGOs with support of other states to put further pressure on unwilling or 
uncooperative states.  
 
Finally, another reason why NGO participation in negotiations on issues like human 
rights and environmental issues is of crucial importance is that NGOs and other non-
state actors have the ability to make parties aware of these issue underlying the 
negotiation. What was most striking about studying the negotiation process for the 
establishment of the UN Disaster Relief Organisation in the 1970s, was that none of the 
state parties ever mentioned the casualties and other humanitarian crises that could be 
prevented by the creation of that particular body. The only interest they had was 
consolidating influence and power at the lowest financial cost. It is up to the NGOs and 
other non-state parties to make their governmental counterparts aware of the fact that 
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there are other, more fundamental issues, like the lives of millions of people or their 
fundamental rights at stake. 
 
Whether human rights have reached the official agenda of the ASEM Dialogue will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
2. The ASEM Dialogue on Human Rights 
 
A. The ASEM Dialogue in general 
 
Structure of ASEM 
 
The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was created in 1996, with its main purpose to 
develop and fortify the relation between Europe and the region of East Asia. The 
relation between the two continents was not new though. Before ASEM was 
materialized, ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meetings were taking place as early as 1978.38 
Institutionalization of this cooperation took place by the conclusion of the so-called 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the member 
states of ASEAN. The Agreement provided for the bi-annual occurrence of the 
dialogue, with ministers of foreign affairs and the economy and with the President of 
the EU.39 As for the economic cooperation, the ASEAN-EU meetings were considered 
to be rather successful, since the cooperation in this field increased considerably since 
the establishment of the dialogue. However, in other fields, such as politics and culture, 
the cooperation was lacking behind. Especially from the European side, there was a 
wish to fortify the cooperation in political areas, since it wished to increase its influence 
in the Asian region to level up to the Americans, who institutionalized their influence in 
the region through the Asia-Pacific Cooperation (APEC). This resulted in the adoption 
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of a report on a new strategy towards Asia by the European Commission.40 However, 
the actual initiative to establish a new form of dialogue between the two regions was 
taken by the government of Singapore. Only after Singapore’s diplomats discussed the 
issue with their French counterparts, the other possible participating countries, like the 
member states of ASEAN were informed.41 
The format chosen for the dialogue was an informal one, without any institutionalisation 
or secretariat.42 The idea was based on two fundamental principles: the principle of 
multilateralism; and the principle of regionalism. The inter-relation between the two 
principles is important; the dialogue has a multilateral nature in that all member states 
are in the process as single entities, as opposed to the ASEAN-EU Dialogue, which 
takes place between two organisations. In the ASEM Process, the member states of 
ASEAN take part, except for Burma/Myanmar (at least not on a presidential level), the 
twenty-five member states of the European Union, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea 
and the European Union. However, each member state is classified according to region, 
which forms, more or less, a coalition. Each region appoints an ASEM Coordinator, for 
assistance in the smooth coordination of the ASEM process.43 There are four 
Coordinators in total: one for the North-East Asian region, one for the South-East Asian 
region, the EU Presidency and the European Commission. As far as the European 
member states are concerned, they are already used to the regional structure, while for 
the East Asian states, especially the North-East Asian states, they have not been 
organized in a regional body before. The ASEM Dialogue forced them to coordinate 
their interests and to formulate their common interests. As for the Southeast Asian 
member states, they had organized themselves already in the 1960s, by establishing 
ASEAN in 1967.  
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Since its establishment, there have been five Summits: the first one to be held in 
Bangkok in 1996, then the London Summit in 1998, the Third Summit in 2000 in Seoul, 
than the 2002 Copenhagen Summit and finally the Hanoi Summit in 2004. The bi-
annual Summits are the highest level policy outline of the ASEM Process: it is where 
the Heads of State and Government and the European Commission come together to set 
out the direction of the Dialogue and formulate the areas of attention between both 
continents. The Ministerial Meetings are of a more coordinating and preparatory nature. 
During these meetings, the ministers in question coordinate and prepare the Summits. 
There are annual meetings between the ministers of foreign, of economic affairs and of 
finance, whereas ministers of other areas meet whenever necessary. 
 
Below the Ministerial Meetings, there is the level of meetings of high-ranking civil 
servants, the so-called Senior Official Meeting (SOM). These senior officials, discuss 
matters of technical cooperation, and they prepare the Foreign Ministerial Meetings and 
the Summits.44  
 
Differences in interests 
 
Studying the two continents between which the Dialogue takes place, there are two 
main regional organisations involved: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and the European Union (EU). There are considerable differences between 
both organisations, which have an effect on the functioning of the Dialogue between the 
two continents as well. ASEAN was set up mainly for the purpose of developing or at 
least structuring economic cooperation between the then five initiators: Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The basis for the cooperation was 
the Bangkok Declaration, which was called merely an intention statement, without a 
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legally binding nature. It lays down rather informal principles and norms that are the 
basis of the regional cooperation between the member states. One of the main features 
of the cooperation between the states in the Southeast Asian region is the so-called 
Asian Way: the ASEAN states are obliged to respect each others’ sovereignty, 
independence, territorial integrity and national identity.45 The leading principle in this 
respect is the principle of non-interference in the national interests in another state. 
Therefore, an intergovernmental based cooperation format is chosen, leaving a lot of 
room for the national power of the member states.  
 
Compared to ASEAN, the European Union has the character of a more supranational 
body: its establishment and mandate is laid down in a set of detailed treaties, assigning 
rather far-going powers to the organs of the Union. Therefore, its cooperation has a far 
more supranational character. Exactly this difference in nature is one of the main 
reasons why the ASEM Dialogue is, on the one hand so unique, but on the other hand so 
complicated to manage. The differences in structure between the two organisations 
cause a difference in expectation between their member states on the “mandate” and the 
effectiveness of the ASEM Dialogue as well. While both sides shared the interests of 
developing economic cooperation from the beginning of the process, both sides had 
other differing ideas about the Dialogue as well. From the Asian side, the ASEM 
Process is used as a means to improve bilateral cooperation with the EU, and to improve 
the mutual relation between the East Asian states in general. Especially the fact that 
China takes part in the Dialogue was considered by the other Asian states as a crucial 
element in strengthening their position towards their European counterparts.46 Most 
Asian states were used to dealing with important matters in informal bilateral 
discussions, instead of during the plenary meeting itself. This approach towards the 
process has made the Dialogue less of a traditional international negotiation forum. It is 
the whole process around the plenary meeting that plays an equally important role.  
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From the European side, the main goal for developing cooperation with the East-Asian 
region was to further strengthen the common approach of the EU on that region. The 
Asian approach was thus focused on cooperation on a bilateral basis, established 
through an inter-regional dialogue forum, while the Europeans were interested in a form 
of cooperation that would actually lead to the development of both regions. In reaching 
this development, the European states were more willing to hand over some of their 
sovereignty than their Asian counterparts. Especially the government of the Peoples’ 
Republic of China has never been eager to give up its sovereignty on any matter.47  
 
Despite lack of interest of the Beijing government in the first years of the ASEM 
Process, China is now one of the main participants in the dialogue. This shift in interest 
was caused by the financial crisis at the end of the 1990s. Before the crisis China was 
rather inward-looking, while the crisis made clear that more regional and interregional 
cooperation was necessary to prevent crises like these to take place in the future, despite 
the fact that China was the only country in the East Asian region that was not hit badly 
by the economic recession. The fact that the United States does not participate in the 
Dialogue, which provides a good opportunity for East Asia and Europe to develop 
common interests and positions and to form a counterweight to the American unilateral 
exercise of power, is one of the main advantages of the Dialogue for the Chinese 
government.48 The main reasons for China to participate in the Dialogue, however, is 
for strengthening of national interests, and not so much for the development of the 
region, unless it can benefit from it itself. This can be concluded from the fact that 
China was very eager to leave the conflict involving the South China Sea out of the 
Dialogue, since this would harm its economic interests. This resulted in a growing role 
of China in the Dialogue, in the form of fulfilment of the role of Regional Coordinator, 
hosting several ministerial and senior officials meetings and acting as co-sponsor in the 
initiatives for the Fourth Summit in Copenhagen.49 This is contrasted by the declining 
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interest in the ASEM Process of another major player in the East Asian region, Japan. 
Especially in the economic field Japan preferred bilateral cooperation, since this is 
easier to implement and therefore suits Japanese interests better.50 However, in the 
Burma/Myanmar case, Japan played an important role in the formulation of a solution. 
Besides, the growing importance of China in the East Asian region and the deteriorating 
relation between both countries might possibly lead to a growing Japanese interest in 
the Dialogue. And especially this rivalry is the main reason for the interest of the 
Republic of Korea in the process. The Seoul government would like to use the ASEM 
Dialogue as an instrument to control the rivalry and to eventually develop stronger 
cooperation in the Northeast Asian region as counterweight for the alliance of ASEAN.  
 
It could be concluded that the interest that the Northeast Asian states have in ASEM are 
of a mainly security nature: ASEM could be used as a means to maintain regional 
stability. Looking at the Burma/Myanmar case, one could come to the same conclusion. 
Japan was an active negotiator in the process, looking for a solution, which would be 
satisfactory for all parties. China, however, supports the Rangoon government, in order 
to, amongst others, prevent a civil war and by this way maintain the stability at its 
borders as well.51 In general, regional and international cooperation have gained 
importance after the terrorist attacks of the 11th of September. Therefore, at the Sixth 
Foreign Ministers Meeting held in Ireland in April 2004, the Ministers once again 
emphasized the importance of the United Nations in this respect.52 Emphasis on the role 
of the United Nations was one of the starting principles of the ASEM Dialogue though, 
formulated by the Singapore government in its initiative for the interregional forum in 
the 1990s.53 The United Nations were considered to be the main body dealing with 
security issues, important for the maintenance of international and regional stability. 
However, on security issues, this organisation is strongly influenced by the United 
States as a Permanent Member of the Security Council. In order to counterweight this 
country, in security but also in economic matters, a new forum had to be created 
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strengthening the European interests in the East Asian region, according to the 
Singapore government. ASEM could be used as a means to increase European trade 
investments in the region and a way to persuade the European Union to open up its 
market to products from Southeast Asia, by reducing its tariffs. Especially Thailand, the 
Philippines and Vietnam have a high interest in this matter.54 
 
Concluding, the Asian states are interested in developing ASEM into an effective 
negotiation forum for mainly two reasons: economic, meaning to attract European 
investment in the region and to increase Asian access to European markets; and 
political, to counterbalance the American hegemony and to increase regional stability in 
Asia. 
 
As for the European Union member states the main interest in creating the ASEM 
forum, was to have a piece of the Asian prosperity.55 The Americans fortified their 
influence in the region already through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), which made the Europeans fear they were lacking behind. The French 
government was co-initiator of the Dialogue, most probably having a high interest in 
counterbalancing the American world power. As regards the issue of security is 
concerned, the conclusion can be drawn that despite the good intentions to 
counterbalance the US, the latter remains the only true global power, making East Asia 
and Europe depending on it. There is not much ASEM can do about that, not even if it 
would function more effectively than it has done so far. 
 
Both Germany and Sweden have formulated a focussed policy on Asia, putting 
emphasis on human rights, democratisation and the rule of law, besides stimulating 
economic relations and cooperating on security matters.56 Both the strategies chosen by 
                                                 
54
 S. Berisck, P. Scannell, B. Brennan (eds.), September 2002, p.5-6 
55
 C.M. Dent, The Asia-Europe Meeting and inter-regionalism; Towards a theory of multilateral utility, 
in: Asian Survey, volume XLIV, no.2, March/April 2004, p.214 
56
 Deutsches Auswärtiges Amt, Aufgaben der deutschen Aussenpolitik; Ostasien am Beginn des 21. 
Jahrhunderts, Berlin, May 2002, p.5-6 and Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Our Future with Asia; 
proposal for a Swedish Asia Strategy, Stockholm, 1999, p.13-14 
 23 
these countries are rather politically driven. There is a high complexity of European 
interests in the region, and securing stability and peace by maintaining good relation 
with the Republic of China is one of the most important ones. In this web of interests, 
when it comes to trade relations, the European Union member states are more able to 
formulate a common policy then when it comes to more politically related issues. There 
are several states, for instance, such as Greece that have shown no interest in 
participating in the East Asian region, while besides Germany and Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and France have shown great interest, which appear to be more national than 
European oriented. These European Union member states have been rather reluctant to 
give up their sovereignty when it comes to foreign policy, and, as the case of 
Burma/Myanmar will show as well, economic interests remain high in the hierarchical 
ranking at the cost of human rights for instance. It is true that each member state of the 
European Union can take up any topic it so desires, without repeating EU’s common 
position. This, however, will not do the wish to speak with one voice any good. 
However, it is not possible otherwise, since many EU member states have bilateral 
relations with their Asian counterparts as well. This complexity clearly shows the 
difficult position the European Union as an organisation with supranational elements 
has.  
 
This difficulty is also reflected in the fulfilment of the functions of the regional 
Coordinators. As compared to Asia, in Europe they are not a representative of a sub-
region. There is the EU Presidency, for which, due to its system of rotation, it is hard to 
maintain continuity in its coordinating functions. Therefore, the European Commission 
is the best alternative as the regional Coordinator, but it is not a state actor. In 2001, it 
formulated a policy for cooperation with Asia under the title “Towards a New Asia 
Strategy”, which document is a first effort to take an integrated and balanced view of 
the cooperation with the Asian continent. The strategy of the European Commission 
focuses on six objectives, ranging from contributing to peace and security in the region 
to promoting development in countries with less welfare opportunities and 
strengthening the awareness of Europe in Asia. The Commission encourages the 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 24 
evolution of the political dialogue in fora like ASEM and ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF).  
 
Regarding Southeast Asia, the Commission adopted a new partnership strategy in 2003, 
focussing on strengthening the role of ASEAN in the region.57 Compared to this 
relation, the cooperation between the European states and the region of North East Asia 
stands out more meagre. Regional cooperation efforts with North East Asia have been 
limited for a long time, due to the heritage of the Second World War and especially the 
Cold War. The European Commission has recently shown more interest in the creation 
of the free trade areas between for instance Japan, South Korea and Singapore.58 The 
European Commission’s policy on China is mainly focussed on engaging it further into 
world affairs, both on political and economic fronts. Involving China in the ASEM 
Dialogue is one step in that direction. 
 
The European Commission has thus a rather extraordinary position in the ASEM 
Dialogue as the only non-state actor. While the European member states seem to 
attached much importance to its participation, their Asian counterparts are more 
sceptical. Malaysian diplomats have called the Commission’s role “redundant”, since all 
other actors in ASEM are “statist”.59 This once again shows the difficulties the ASEM 
Dialogue faces: the fundamental difference in opinion between both continents on the 
realization of regional cooperation. Another cultural difference in opinion is on the issue 
of human rights. The role these values have played so far in the ASEM Dialogue will be 
discussed in the next paragraph. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
57
 European Commission, A new Partnership with South East Asia, COM(2003) 399/4  
58
 European Commission, The EU’s relations with Asia; North East Asia, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asia/reg/nea.htm 
 25 
B. The role of human rights in the ASEM Summits 
 
Differing views on human rights between Europe and Asia; the Asian Values Debate 
 
Human rights have always played a rather peculiar role in the ASEM Dialogue. There is 
a difference in the interpretation of human rights values, which can be traced back on 
the distinctive views on regional cooperation, state sovereignty and the realization of 
national society. Looking at the fulfilment of regional cooperation in both continents, 
the European Union was established not long after the Second World War, and the idea 
of cooperation evolved to an organisation with supranational powers. Compared to this 
concept, ASEAN is clearly the opposite of this formalised and institutionalised 
European model of cooperation. The Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) 
was established in 1967 as a careful attempt to rather maintain friendly relations 
between the states in the region than to come to far-going regional cooperation.60 The 
association is based on the Bangkok Declaration, which is hardly more than a non-
binding statement of principles. It mainly focuses on the unity in the Southeast Asian 
region, which means that all states in this area should have the possibility to become 
member of the association, which could then again serve the regional stability and 
friendly relations. The focus on friendly relations between its member states also 
resulted in the application of the principle of non-interference in internal matters of 
states. All possible conflicts are dealt with in a careful, friendly way, trying to maintain 
the dialogue instead of putting political or economic pressure on a non-cooperative 
state. This approach is the so-called Asian Way. Japan, China and the Republic of 
Korea share the importance attached to the principle.  
 
The principle of non-interference in internal matters of other states resulted in a more or 
less stable situation in the region during the Cold War. Another reason for the creation 
of ASEAN was to face the dangers coming from Communistic China and Russia on the 
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one hand and the growing, especially economic, importance of Japan on the other.61 
This changed rapidly after the end of the Cold War. “Western” states, like the EU 
member states, tried to increase their influence in other parts of the world, which were 
formerly out of reach for them because of the bipolar power structure. Due to the 
disappearance of the ideological conflict between the two Superpowers, there was more 
room to link political to economic interests. The European states tried to increase their 
sphere of influence in the Asian continent in order to counterbalance the growing 
domination of the US, as has been said before. 
 
As far as economic issues were concerned, the Asian states were willing to start a 
dialogue or some form of cooperation. This is how ASEM was created. However, the 
political dialogue, or, more specifically the human rights dialogue was avoided. One 
main argument from the Asian side for that was the fact that the Europeans tried to use 
the human rights debate as a means to preserve their dominant position in a new global 
order. The argument used by several Southeast Asian leaders was that the European 
states did not accept the fact that the Asian had their own approach to deal with the 
changes in the international society, especially regarding democracy and human rights.62 
One important argument used by the Asian leaders to counter the European pressure on 
universalist working of human rights, is the fact that the “Western” notion of the rights 
is individually based, while Asian society uses the community as the starting point, to 
which the individual is subordinated. The former Prime Minister of Malaysia Mahathir 
bin Mohamad stated publicly that his government would chose the party and country 
above democracy.63 As a result, interests of the state or the community are chosen over 
the democratic rights of the people. Democracy could easily lead to chaos, which would 
destabilize the community as a whole. With his successor, more chance of movement in 
the direction of democracy is possible, since his election in 2003 was widely regarded 
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as an approval of his more moderate vision on Islam, state and society.64 The ideas of 
Mahathir on the issue of human rights and cultural interpretation were shared by several 
political leaders in the Southeast Asian region though. The surrender of human rights 
protection was considered to be necessary in order to come to economic development. 
The argument used by for instance Singapore’s government was that full human rights 
protection was only possible in a perfect state where everybody is allowed and capable 
of doing his own thing. This has not worked out this way, and Lee Kuan Yew, 
Singapore’s elder statesman, doubt whether it will ever do so. Most recently, the 
government has relaxed some of its conservative positions on the fulfilment of society. 
Whether this is enough or not, and whether this has an effect on their views on human 
rights and their universal working will remain to be seen. The fact that still only half of 
the member states of ASEAN are party to the main human rights treaties in the United 
Nations human rights system is not a telling sign.65  
 
This emphasis on the so-called “Asian values”-debate touches upon the more general 
debate within human rights theory on the universal application versus cultural relativism 
of human rights. It goes outside the scope of this paper to describe this debate now, but 
it is related to an important reason why the human rights debate in ASEM is going as 
rigid as it does: the European side is pressuring the universal working of human rights, 
the way they are laid down in the various UN and regional human rights treaties. Most 
Asian counterparts, however, despite the fact that they officially acknowledge the 
universal working of the rights, hide behind the above mentioned arguments mainly 
based on the idea that their culture does not totally accept the universal notion as 
proclaimed by mainly the Western states. Their fear of Western domination, resulting in 
the loss of sovereignty and power is an important basis for that.  
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What will be analyzed now is what role human rights have played so far in the ASEM 
Dialogue and what its effect was on the relation between the various member states. 
This will be of importance for the study of the case of the participation of 
Burma/Myanmar as well, since this case clearly shows the different sensitivities among 
the member states to the ASEM Dialogue as related to the issue of human rights 
protection. 
 
The role of human rights in the ASEM Dialogue 
 
The position of the ASEAN countries on regional cooperation without clear 
institutionalized restrains, with strong emphasis on the maintenance of friendly relations 
amongst the member states and on the prevention of regional conflicts, and thus 
avoiding any controversies in the official meetings, is reflected in their position on the 
possibility of having a human rights dialogue within the ASEM Process. Studying the 
negotiation process of the first Summit, including the final adopted Chairman’s 
Statement, it becomes clear that this meeting was used to improve dialogue between 
both continents, to share concerns and aspirations and to come up with a common vision 
of the future.66 Another important goal of the first Summit was to intensify trade and 
investment, following from the section on “reinforcing economic cooperation”.67 Since 
this was the first Summit, in which the framework for future cooperation had to be 
created, most state parties felt that controversial issues like human rights had to be 
avoided. This avoidance did not only come from the Asian side, but it suited most 
European countries as well.68 This way, the economic interests in the growing East 
Asian region could be satisfied, without upsetting the relation at the first minute. In the 
Chairman’s Statement, no clear mention was made to the term “human rights”, except 
when the respect for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was mentioned. Rather 
was the term “fundamental rights” used, mentioned together with principles like 
“mutual respect, equality, (…) non-intervention (…) in each other’s internal affairs”. 
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From the European side, there was some intention expressed during the unofficial 
meetings, to insert human rights matters in the final Chairman’s statement. However, 
this would mean that, since it is then an official position of all states, the violating state 
in question could be criticized for its human rights policy. This was clearly not in 
accordance with the Asian perspective of the non-intervention principle, and therefore, 
the term “human rights” was avoided.69 Another delicate issue was avoided, through 
strong mediation of the Thai host government, to result into a clash: the former 
Indonesian President Suharto threatened to leave the Summit if Portugal would bring up 
the issue of East Timor. Thailand used its influence to negotiate bilaterally with both 
countries to avoid further strong words between both countries.70 Because of these kind 
of outflanking movements, in which bilateral negotiations are used to settle issues rather 
than negotiations during the official sessions, the first Summit can be considered a 
success, being able to bring both continents together and to create a spirit and will for 
future cooperation.  
 
These outflanking movements were considered to be important for the success of the 
future Summits as well, since controversial issues had to be avoided if possible. 
Therefore, the possibility of parallel, informal sessions in which issues like the rule of 
law and human rights could be discussed was created. In this respect, actors like the 
Asia-Europe Foundation, the Asia-Europe Vision Group and the Council for Asia-
Europe Cooperation (CAEC) were established. The -Europe Foundation organised 
informal session on human rights issues, held annually alternating in Europe and Asia. 
The proposal for these informal sessions was drafted by Sweden with cosponsoring of 
France. Even though it was not an official ASEM initiative, it attracted participation of 
all ASEM member states, together with NGOs and academics.71 All sessions, being 
hosted so far by Sweden, Indonesia, France and China, consist of workshops on human 
rights issues. During the first session in Lund in 1997, emphasis was put on the cultural 
implementation of human rights, despite their universal working. During the second 
session, held in Beijing in 1999, once again the difference in Asian and European values 
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was stressed. The recognition of the differences in cultural interpretation of human 
rights is very important, since this is the issue that hinders the human rights dialogue on 
the state level. The recognition of the difference can only create mutual understanding 
and respect. However, the recognition of cultural differences should not be used as a 
shield for a fair and open dialogue on the matter. It seems that the Asian participation in 
these informal sessions has been coloured by the principle of non-interference and the 
notion of Asian values as well, especially when China hosted the second informal 
meeting in 1997. Despite the fact that these parallel sessions have been held for several 
years now, and besides the point that it is a positive sign that Asian states have been 
willing to cooperate in the sessions and even host them, they have been kept informal 
and the initiatives have not managed to penetrate into the “decision-making” processes 
of the official Summits. What was meant as a means to take the pressure of the 
controversial issues by discussing the matters outside the official forum, together with 
other participants than state officials, and what eventually should have lead to 
incorporation of the controversial matters in the official dialogue has not worked out 
this way yet. It seems like the informal sessions have so far been used as an excuse not 
to deal with the controversial matters on the official level. Besides the fact that the 
informal seminars have an added value concerning the creation of mutual respect and 
understanding on the issue of human rights, more should be done. 
 
Returning to the formal sessions, the Second and Third Summits were occupied with the 
developments in the international relations of that moment: in 1998, the Asian region 
was forcefully hit by a financial crisis, which seemed to completely wipe out the spirit 
for future cooperation, which had made the first gathering such a success. The Asian 
countries were disappointed by the lack of interest shown by their European 
counterparts in donating money of providing technical assistance to deal with this crisis, 
while the Europeans believed this was not the right policy, since the East Asian states 
had more or less themselves to blame for the crisis they were in, because of bad policy 
and lack of mutual cooperation.72 Besides, the European countries had other things on 
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their mind: the crisis on the Balkans was erupting into a regional conflict, with great 
flows of refugees and a developing humanitarian crisis. This resulted in the fact that 
neither human rights were discussed in the official second Summit, not were they 
inserted in the official closing document.73 Even in the bilateral talks between the 
European Commission and China, no mention was made of its dubious human rights 
policy, but focus was put on the further development of economic relations between the 
two parties, coloured by the fact that China was almost the only East Asian nation not 
hit by the financial crisis. In that sense the European parties had more interest in 
reserving a piece of the Chinese economic cake than in mentioning the more unpopular 
issues at stake.  
 
At the second Summit, the Asia-Europe People’s Forum (AEPF) was established, 
consisting of those civil society actors interested in Asia-European cooperation, but 
which were not accepted as official participants in the process.74 The aim of this 
umbrella organisation is threefold: to strengthen networking between and across Asia 
and Europe; to analyse common interests; and to provide an opportunity for critical 
opinions on the official process to be expressed.75 Especially the latter function could 
have great value for the discussion of human rights issues. The parallel sessions, 
organised to the official Summits and open for all non-state actors with an interest in the 
ASEM Dialogue, could be used to shed a critical light on the human rights situation of a 
certain country or on a certain theme. This was done so for instance at the parallel 
session of the AEPF to the fifth Summit held in November 2004 in Hanoi, Vietnam, in 
which the poverty and human rights policy of the host country was being discussed.76 
That was probably the reason why the Vietnamese government did everything in its 
power to prevent this parallel session from taking place. 
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The Third Summit was coloured by a more positive development: the historical 
approach between both countries on the Korean peninsula. Other issues on the political 
agenda were the situation on the Balkans, East Timor, problems in the South China Sea 
and, for the first time, democratisation and human rights. It seemed that the Asian 
partners were more willing to discuss the issue than they had been so far.77 The reason 
for this shift is unclear. One explanation could be that the Asian states had bended for 
the “pressure” by the European states to discuss the matter of human rights. Another 
reason could be that the events on the Korean peninsula positively effect the political 
dialogue on all matters. What the reason for the openness of the Asian states may be, the 
fact is that the issue of human rights was even adopted in the Chairman’s Statement: 
“Leaders committed themselves to promote and protect all human rights, including the 
right to development, and fundamental freedoms, bearing in mind their universal, 
indivisible and interdependent character as expressed at the World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna.” [emphasis added].78 Democracy and human rights were in a 
similar way inserted in the basic agreement, the so-called Asia-Europe Cooperation 
Framework (AECF) 2000.79 There were some Asian states, however, that feared 
interference in their internal affairs and far-going criticism from the European side. 
Therefore, in paragraph 12 of the Cooperation Framework, mention was made of the 
importance of issues of common interest, “not excluding any issue beforehand but 
exercising wisdom and judiciousness in selecting the topics for discussion.” The 
dialogue had to be based on mutual respect and non-intervention in the internal affairs 
of each state, whether direct or indirect. The mentioning of the non-interference 
principle was mostly supported by China, Malaysia and Singapore.80  
 
Looking at the change in interest in the human rights dialogue, the Third Summit in 
Seoul was characterized by reform and changes in general. The AECF is one example 
of the possible reform, as was a paper produced by the Commission called 
“VADEMECUM – Modalities for Future ASEM Dialogue – Taking the Process 
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Forward”, in which greater informality and interactivity were suggested. Suggestions 
for these improvements were to have more time between the official sessions, in the 
form of cocktails, coffee breaks and lunches. These informal sessions could be a way to 
improve discussion about the more delicate issues, such as human rights. This did not 
encourage the human rights discussion at the Fourth Summit though, since the political 
dialogue of the Fourth Summit was fully occupied by the event of the terrorist attacks of 
11 September 2001. This event had such a dramatic impact on the entire international 
order that a discussion on human rights in East Asia was not an option. Much focus in 
the political dialogue was on the war against Afghanistan and, more in general, the fight 
against terrorism. The cultural dialogue was also coloured by the terrorist attacks, 
aiming to bridge the growing gap between the Islamic and non-Islamic world.81  
 
The Fifth Summit was dominated by the question of enlargement: the European Union 
had than just acquired ten new member states and ASEAN wanted to allow the 
participation of its three most recently accessed member states, Laos Cambodia and 
Burma/Myanmar, to the official dialogue as well. The participation of the latter caused a 
lot of discussion and controversy between both continents, as has briefly been described 
earlier. Despite the fact that the participation of Burma/Myanmar in the Fifth ASEM 
Summit is closely linked with the possibility to have a human rights dialogue in the 
ASEM Process, it will be discussed in the fourth chapter on the description and 
implications of the Burma/Myanmar. 
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3. The role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in human rights protection 
 
A. The role of non-governmental organisations on human rights protection in general 
 
Mandate and legitimacy 
 
As has been described in the first chapter, non-governmental organisations nowadays 
form an important part of international negotiation fora. There are various types of 
NGOs, varying from those that support the common good, such as environmental and 
human rights issues to those that are created for the protection of the interests of their 
own members, such as employers organisations of companies. All these organisations 
fall in the definition of non-governmental organisations, as “ non-profit making, non-
violent organisations, which do not represent governments or states”, as was used in 
chapter one. There are more definitions used to describe the term, and it is not clear 
which one is all inclusive, if one is at all. A fact is, that the term is taken up in article 71 
of the Charter of the United Nations, without a clear definition. This article refers to the 
ability of the Economic and Social Council to provide national and international 
organisations with consultative status. There are, however, little points of reference in 
this provision as to what constitutes an NGO. In 1986 an European Convention on the 
Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental Organisations 
(“European Convention” or “Convention”) was adopted, stating that international NGOs 
should have a non-profit-making aim of international utility, being established by an 
instrument of international law or party to the Convention, with activities in two or 
more states, having their statutory office on the territory of a party to the Convention.82 
The disadvantage of this definition is that it only applies to international NGOs, while 
especially in the field of human rights, local or national NGOs are of crucial importance 
for the improvement of human rights protection. Their interaction with international 
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human rights NGOs will described later in general and with a specific reference to the 
region of Southeast Asia.  
 
Yet another flaw of the definition would be that it is narrowed down to those 
organisations with an aim of international utility. The issue of human rights falls within 
this definition, but the question arises whether the employers’ organisation of a certain 
company should be in- or excluded from the definition. Finally, the definition used in 
the European Convention includes those organisations founded by state parties to the 
Convention. There is a danger to this element of the definition, because of the existence 
of so-called “GONGOs”, QUANGO’s” or “DONGO’s”. These are organisations that 
appear to be non-governmental, but in practice have strong ties with the government of 
the state by which it was established.83 Therefore, an NGO should on paper and in 
practice not be a representative of a state, nor should it have the purpose of making 
profits. For the purpose of this study, an organisation can be qualified as a human rights 
NGO when it is primarily concerned with the promotion and protection of human rights 
and when it uses international and national human rights standards to reach this aim.84 
 
This leads us to the question of the mandate of the NGOs. Is this mandate general and 
universal or is it limited, either subject- or geographically-based? And if this mandate is 
limited to the territory of a certain state, does it have international legal personality? Do 
NGOs have this status at all, whether broad and general or limited regionally? If the 
organisations are granted this personality, this would have consequences for their 
performance under international law, such as to the ability to make treaties or to bring 
claims of breaches of international law before the respective instances. Especially in 
human rights protection the latter privilege would be a great loop forward. This would 
mean that NGOs could file complaints to, for instance, the European Court of Human 
Rights in case of violation of human rights in general, without experiencing a direct 
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negative effect of the violation in question. As will be described latter in the part on the 
functions of human rights NGOs, this is not the case. 
 
Traditionally international law only grants international legal personality to states. 
However, as can be concluded from the analysis in chapter one on the role of NGOs in 
international negotiations, this is no longer the situation the international community is 
in. NGOs play a growing role and a suitable response has to be found to deal with these 
developments. The recognition of NGOs by the Economic and Social Council of the 
United Nations, as supported by article 71 of the UN Charter is a step in this direction. 
However, fact remains that NGOs can only appear on the international plane when they 
are being invited by states, through a treaty or by an international governmental 
organisation like the UN or the Council of Europe. The observer and consultative status 
are the only formalized expression of granting them international legal personality. 
Studying the ASEM Dialogue, no such recognition has been granted to them. Even 
worse, NGOs have a hard time having their parallel sessions not hindered by some state 
parties to the Dialogue.  
 
The issue of international legal personality is also important for the question of 
legitimacy of NGOs.85 On behalf of whom do they raise issues of human rights 
violations? By whom can they be held accountable for their policies and actions?  
According to Peter Baehr and Menno Kamminga in their study on a code of conduct for 
Human Rights NGOs, legitimacy is derived from international law and generated by the 
veracity of the information provision, tangible support and general goodwill.86 Studying 
the statute of Amnesty International, as both professors have done in their analysis, all 
conditions are met. There is a direct reference to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and other international human rights standards. The statute is available on the 
internet, accessible to all, as opposed to Human Rights Watch, which is comparable to 
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Amnesty when it comes to seize and influence. Does this make Human Rights Watch 
less legitimate as an organisation? After all it is harder to monitor its activities on 
compliance with its mission statement. The International Commission of Jurists refers 
in its Statute to the international human rights standards, which are “universal, 
interdependent and indivisible”, but without specializing which standards it refers to. In 
the first article the organisation’s legal status is provided for as a non-profit and non-
political association, which is close to the general definition of an NGO. The Statute of 
Amnesty, however, refers to it as a global community of human rights defenders, with 
human rights groups associated to it, and open for individual membership, as clearly 
defined in article 15 of the Statute. Studying the founding documents of smaller or non-
Western human rights NGOs, like for instance Imparsial in Indonesia, or the Asia 
Foundation, reference is made to international human rights standards. 
 
However, despite the fact that the organisations themselves make clear reference to 
international law, this does not change their status under international law. The 
reference of NGOs to the international human rights standards provides a justification 
and basis for their activities, but it would be an unjustifiable extension of their power to 
derive their status from these references. The fact remains that the only mention to the 
status of non-governmental organisations is made in the UN Chapter and the ECOSOC 
Resolutions based thereon and in the Council of Europe system in the European 
Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-
Governmental Organisations and the Resolutions of the Committee of Ministers.87 The 
set of laws that regulates the existence of NGOs are still national though. The 
recognition of NGOs as regulated in the above mentioned European Convention only 
extends this recognition of NGOs in state parties to those NGOs already recognized in 
another state party.88 In many occasions, the national laws of states are not sufficiently 
equipped to deal with international NGOs, while it is their duty to provide the 
opportunity to form organisations with supporting laws, under the right to assembly, as 
adopted in many treaties. There is a discrepancy between the international tasks that 
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most human rights NGOs have set for themselves and the struggle with the national 
laws, which sometimes limit their ability to perform these tasks. However, the fact 
remains that, as was the conclusion on the NGO participation at the international 
negotiation table as well, that states are still the dominant actor in international law. The 
ability of NGOs under international law to perform their tasks is still dependent on the 
states’ willingness to allow them to enter the international arena.  
 
This conclusion, however, does not answer the question of legitimacy entirely. In the 
case of the ASEM Dialogue, for instance, one often heard complaint is that those NGOs 
being able to influence policy are mostly based in Europe, having their voice heard on 
the level of the European Union. In what way does this represent the Asian people? 
What is their legitimacy concerning ASEM, if they claim to be restricted to this forum, 
if they only represent one side of the dialogue? What can the Asian members of NGOs 
do in order to get their voice heard and to have a “vote” in the decisions on policies of 
the (human rights) NGOs working in the field of ASEM? One argument refuting the 
democratic deficit of human rights NGOs, is that NGOs legitimate themselves by 
demanding their place in the international arena. NGOs, especially the ones working in 
the field of human rights, represent values and norms, instead of people. They are not 
like a state, of which there is no turning away from. If one does not like the policies or 
aims of an NGO, it can ignore it, or resign its membership, if the organisation has any. 
The demand for democratic legitimacy originates from the idea to view the recent world 
order trough the eyes of states, not allowing for any other entities, with other structures 
and missions to be present. Does this mean that NGOs do not have to answer for their 
behaviour at all? NGOs do have to apply the norms and values laid down by national 
and international law just as much as any other entity within the national legal order of 
states. Besides, those NGOs that do have members often also have an executive board, 
which has to justify their actions to their rank and file. For those NGOs which do not 
have that, support is voluntary based. Therefore, the demand for democratic justification 
ends here. Once they are officially granted with international legal status, which would 
also be the time to set up some kind of international code of conduct, which is absent so 
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far, there are clear obligations that can be monitored. As long as this is not the case, 
national law provides NGOs their legal status and the criticism of democratic deficit is 
not valid here. 
 
This general counter argument on democratic deficit, however, does not justify the fact 
that the Asian NGOs have trouble effectively participating in the ASEM Dialogue. 
Their exact role will be analyzed in the example case of Burma/Myanmar, as will be 
described in the fourth chapter. 
 
Functions 
 
In the analysis on NGO participation in international negotiations, seven main tasks or 
activities of these organisations were distilled. The question that arises here, is whether 
these activities of NGOs in general also apply to human rights organisations, or whether 
these specific organisations have a specific list of activities. An important activity of 
human rights NGOs is the documentation and publication of human rights violations. 
The collection of information and, thereby, exposing human rights violations is 
considered to be one of the core activities of human rights NGOs. While information in 
itself is not enough to stop or prevent human rights violations, it is a prerequisite for 
effective action. What is important for states, but even more so for international 
organisations, is in order to develop an effective policy knowledge of the circumstances 
is of crucial value. International organisations, and especially human rights NGOs, have 
a reputation of collecting valuable information. Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch have an important function in this, for instance on the issue of torture in 
the 1970s and 1980s, in which Amnesty provided states and the United Nations with 
information on cruel practices in various states. This eventually led to the adoption of 
the UN Convention Against Torture.89 Another example are the so-called “Human 
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Dimension Implementation Meetings” of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE), which is a platform for interaction between NGOs and 
representatives of member states on various human rights issues. Besides these meetings 
for exchange of general information, seminars are held on specific topics related to 
human rights, in which NGOs perform an important information providing role.90  
 
NGOs can be called the main providers of information on human rights standards. 
Therefore, they are responsible for providing states, international organisations and the 
public reliable and well-documented information. Dependable and complete 
information is not only important for the effectively functioning of human rights 
mechanisms, but it is also a moment on which human rights NGOs can be monitored. 
Referring back at the issue of legitimacy, the reputation of NGOs are dependent on the 
reliability of their work, and thus of their collected information. The right balance has to 
be struck between providing information in a timely manner, so sometimes this has to 
be done without precisely verifying the information, and providing the correct and 
dependable information. The provision of information is a powerful tool in the hands of 
NGOs: they are usually the first to put an issue on the international radar. If a certain 
region does not get NGO attention the governments of states will most certainly not pay 
attention to the particular situation. This is part of the naming and shaming tactic: if a 
certain issue is brought under international attention, most states cannot afford to ignore 
it. On the other hand, if NGOs ignore a situation, states will most likely not take the 
situation up either. This is the so-called Chad Rule.91 In the selection of information 
NGOs can be biased as well. Formulating a certain situation in a negative way can be a 
justification for the existence of the NGO in question. A study performed by Fred 
Grünfeld on the information provision of NGOs compared to states shows that 
regarding civil and political rights the chosen NGOs, in this case Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch provide in most cases more information than states like The 
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Netherlands and Norway, but when it comes to economic, social and cultural rights, the 
information provision of these organisations lacks somewhat behind. The only positive 
exception is the United States of America, which government has a constitutional 
obligation to report extensively on the human rights situation in those countries with 
which the countries has ties.92 The question arises about the representation of this 
research. One important conclusion that can be drawn here, and which is likely to be 
valid in general for the functioning of human rights NGOs in the provision of 
information, is the fact that states have to consider human rights against other interests. 
Therefore, in bilateral negotiations or relations, a critical position on human rights can 
be harmful for interests of the critical state in question. If criticism has to be ventilated, 
it should be done so in a multilateral context. Regarding the situation of the human 
rights violations in Burma/Myanmar the European coalition of Great Britain, Denmark 
and The Netherlands uses the European Union to put pressure on the country in 
question. One consideration might be that this organisation as a whole is more effective 
in putting pressure than a single country. But maintaining good relations with the 
Republic of China, which supports the Burmese government, might have a lot to do 
with it as well. 
 
Closely connected with the collection and publication of information are the other 
activities of human rights NGOs: education, advocacy, standard-setting and assistance 
with monitoring. Regarding the educational function of NGOs, the target groups define 
the format of the activities. The general public can be reached through information 
bulletins, public campaigns and advertisement in for instance the media. Through public 
education a basis can be created for action against a certain state. The use of internet is 
important in this regard. 
 
But governments can be educated, for instance through the discussion fora used in the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as described above. Besides, 
international NGOs can educate national NGOs trough trainings and specialist 
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workshops, for instance in the new member states of the Council of Europe.93 The main 
aim of education is to create awareness among the public, the states or in international 
organisations, which hopefully will result in a better defence of the public of their own 
rights and in a demand for changes in other countries for more protection. 
 
This latter aspect is what human rights advocacy is about as well: through exposure of 
human rights violations, NGOs try to create support of the public and supportive 
government to force for more protection measures in a certain state or area. Through 
effective negotiation NGOs have to reach the more influential states or form a large 
coalition with smaller states in order to influence international policy as effectively as 
possible. The larger the coalition is, the larger the basis will be, which is positive for the 
legitimacy of the action undertaken by the NGO in question. Human rights advocacy is 
the heart of policy influence, and is closely connected with the provision of information 
and with the agenda setting activities of NGOs.  
 
After issues have been put on the international agenda, the phase of standard setting 
takes off. The role NGOs can play in this phase is largely instrumental: it can provide 
information, knowledge and technical assistance that is necessary in the preparation of 
treaties. The creation of the Statute of the International Criminal Court is still one of the 
most successful examples of NGO participation in the drafting of the treaty. Another 
example is the establishment of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. Already in the early phase 
of the preparation of the document by the established working group NGOs played a 
role in information exchange and technical assistance.94 But even in the 1940s there 
were pioneers, not yet called human rights NGOs though, that put human rights in the 
journalistic and academic spotlight.95  
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Finally, the phase after standard-setting is the monitoring of compliance of states with 
the treaty agreed. This can be done so through NGO assistance to victims in an 
international judicial or quasi-judicial procedure. NGOs do not have party status, except 
before the European Court of Human Rights. This status is limited, however, to the 
cases in which the NGO itself is a victim of a human rights violation.96 Other ways of 
NGO participation in these cases is through so-called third-party intervention, which are 
used to protect persons who are unrepresented, to protect the public interest or to guard 
the procedure before the international organ in question.97 Furthermore, NGOs can 
participate in these procedures as a witness or in the function of provision of legal 
assistance or aid to individual victims.  
 
Besides the quasi-judicial procedures of dealing with individual complaints, most UN 
human rights treaties provide for a reporting procedure, which demands a report on 
compliance with the provisions of the treaty on an annual or bi-annual basis or every 
four years. The role NGOs play in this respect is through shadow reports: reports 
additional to those of the states and often more critical, which can be used by the treaty 
body in the discussion of the country report with the representative of the government in 
question.98 Organisations like the Dutch Section of the International Commission of 
Jurists (NJCM), Defence for Children International and Amnesty International have 
been active in this regard. Coalitions of NGOs, handing in one shadow report, have 
been formed in the past as well, and are a useful means to combine knowledge and 
networks. Besides the fact that shadow report are used to make state report complete, 
and to form a critical note to the sometimes too rose-coloured state reports, these NGO 
reports can serve as a catalyst for social debate, both on a national and international 
level.  
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Interaction between national and international human rights NGOs 
 
As with the shadow reports, which can be a combined project of several national and 
international human rights NGOs, these organisations can cooperate in all other fields as 
well. Local human rights activists, with their specific knowledge of the local situation, 
can complement the more generally based international organisations, which have better 
access to international negotiation platforms, media and policymakers, and vice versa. 
Besides, international NGOs often have more funding to be present at the large 
conferences and to have more access to the important policy-making meetings. 
However, also for international NGOs funding and staff remains a topic of concern.  
 
The most important area of cooperation between local and international NGOs is in the 
area of information provision and publication. International NGOs often enjoy a high 
level of legitimacy. The reputation of large international organisations such as Human 
Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
is very good and states rely on their reports. These reports, however, could not be 
composed without the help of local human rights activists, either through their 
assistance to the representatives of the international organisation that is sent to the field 
or through specific information provided by the local organisations.99 Therefore, the 
organisations on both levels are interdependent: local NGOs need their international 
counterparts to have their voice heard in the international arena, while international 
organisations need the local ones to get a better understanding of the local political, 
cultural and social situation.  
 
Moreover, international NGOs can help their local counterparts to gain access to 
international human rights systems, for instance in their assistance of victims in 
individual complaints procedures. Amnesty International and the International 
Commission, for instance, sometimes speak on behalf of national organisations at the 
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UN or they provide the opportunity to local organisations to represent themselves.100 
This bridge function can be of great importance for NGOs willing to participate more in 
the ASEM Dialogue. Especially Asian NGOs complain that it is difficult for them to 
raise critical issues to their governments, since there is still fear among Asian 
governments that NGOs could challenge and threaten their power.101 Therefore, the 
hope of the Asian NGOs is grounded on the cooperation with their European 
counterparts to get more grip on the ASEM Dialogue. What the exact influence of Asian 
NGOs is will be discussed in the next paragraph. 
 
B. The role of non-governmental organisations in human rights protection in Southeast 
Asia 
 
Before going into the topic of the role of NGOs in Asia, it is wise to return to the 
discussion of the definition of civil society as described briefly in the first chapter. In 
this chapter civil society, of which NGOs can be said to form a part, is regarded as a 
counterweight of the state, in which individual, groups and other entities participate on a 
basis of free will. This element of free will is considered to be crucial for a good life. 
This concept of a good life is rather Western based, as case was made above. The 
question that arises here is whether this definition of civil society can be used for 
studying the influence of Asian civil society on government policy. How far does Asian 
concept of civil society differ from the European ideas?102  
 
This discussion on the differences in concepts of civil society in Asia and Europe is 
closely related to the discussion of the different interpretations of human rights. Some 
scholars argue that the concept of civil society is still in a developing stage, while others 
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even deny that such a concept exists at all in Asia.103 The core elements of civil society 
in Europe are that it is a collection of individuals, organizations, etc. that is based on 
free will, independent from the states serving as a counterweight to the state. In Europe 
this was developed by the “bourgeoisie”, mainly out of economic interests, with a clear 
distinction between public and private sector.104 With the latter element a problem arises 
in the case of Asia: there is no clear distinction between public and private sector. There 
is a large so-called unofficial sector, falling in between private and public sector. 
Besides, the question arises whether a “bourgeoisie”, as was present in Europe in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries to develop a sector that became an important check 
on the use of power by the state, is present in this form in Asia. Slowly, a new middle 
class, with an urban orientation, and well educated is emerging at least in the Southeast 
Asian region.105 However, to what extent can this middle class perform the same task as 
the European bourgeoisie did in filling up the space left to private actors? In Southeast 
Asian countries, this space is rather small, due to the authoritarian nature of some of the 
states. As in the human rights discussion, leaders like Mahathir of Malaysia or Suharto 
in Indonesia always argued that forces counterbalancing the power of the government 
were dangerous to the stability of the state and should therefore be hindered. This 
emphasis on internal stability and security was a legitimate argument for a long time, 
since most states in Southeast Asia have been more or less stable for some decades now. 
This focus on stability and security resulted in the creation of the regional association of 
ASEAN, dealing with all uncertain external factors of the Cold War, the fall of the 
Soviet Union as a Super Power, and the changing nature of conflicts. This argument was 
valid for a long time to restrict human rights and to narrow down the possibilities for 
civil society actors to work on political reform. However, the financial crisis, together 
with the political crises of East Timor, the fall of the Suharto regime and the jailing of 
Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia paved the way for political reform. Slowly, the room for 
civil society to manoeuvre is extending. One example in this respect is the situation in 
Malaysia. In this country, the movement of “Reformasi”, which symbolizes the political 
reform it is going through, a growing role is played by civil society actors like NGOs 
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and activists.106 There are a few factors that determined the influence of these actors. 
First of all civil society had become growingly active, also through the raise of the 
internet, as an important non-state controlled medium for information. The internet was 
used for the creation of public awareness on more critical issues like democratization 
and human rights. Besides, the government decided not to act to harshly to prevent the 
rise of the civil society actors, since this would create martyrs internally and a very bad 
reputation externally, as was the case with the bloody repression of student protests in 
Burma/Myanmar and China in the late 1980s. Finally, the political climate in the region 
with the financial and political crises, was ripe for change. Therefore, the role these civil 
society actors played was growing, but their influence was only as large since they 
combined forces with the political opposition.107 
 
Does this situation in Malaysia serve as an example for the entire region though, 
especially when it comes to the role of NGOs specifically? Studying the situation in the 
Philippines, for example, space for popular involvement in civil society organisations 
expanded greatly after the revolution in 1986, which ended the twenty years of Marcos 
rule.108 NGOs take up all kinds of non-economic concerns, such as health care, literacy 
but also human rights. There is thus a lively sector of citizen participation in for instance 
NGOs. This has evolved into a strong check and balance on the government: the civil 
society dynamism can surge so high that it can bring about regime change, or at least 
call for it, as has happened against President Gloria Macapagal Arrayo in July this 
year.109 Here, there is no coalition building with the government, as is the case in 
Malaysia. If done in a balanced way, this system of checks and balances can work as a 
strengthening mechanism for democracy and human rights. However, in the case of the 
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Philippines, since the Marcos era, there have been so many challenges to the legitimacy 
of the government in power, that it has a destabilizing and disturbing effect. This 
resulted in the breach of the main principles of a democratic state, namely transparency, 
the rule of law, accountability and democratic participation.110 Studying the situation of 
human rights defenders in 2004, as has been done by the International Federation for 
Human Rights in their report published on 31 March 2005, the situation of human rights 
NGOs in the Philippines does not give rise to a positive view. Important proponents of 
the abolition of the death penalty were harassed and even executed, as were other 
representatives of human rights NGOs. The report concludes that these extra-judicial 
killings created a climate of fear, in which the freedom of expression and democracy 
were undermined.111 However, on the other hand studying the entire report, the situation 
in some other countries in the region of Southeast Asia, like Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia is worse: besides executions and disappearance of representatives of human 
rights NGOs, the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly are restricted, and 
economic, social and cultural rights are not lived up to.112 On Vietnam, the report states 
that “the communist authorities continued to blatantly stifle all form of criticism and 
dissent, as they increased the repression against all divergent opinions, thus increasingly 
restricting the freedoms of opinion and expression guaranteed by the 1992 
Constitution”.113 This complies with the conclusion drawn by Sebastian Bersick on the 
difficulty of Asian NGOs to raise critical issues to their governments.114  
 
It is important to note, however, that each state in Southeast Asia had its own history of 
development, with more differences between them in the last century than is the case in 
the more homogenous situation of Europe. These differences in history have had a clear 
influence on the rise of NGOs in each state separately. In Indonesia for instance, under 
the somewhat liberal regime of President Sukarno NGOs could emerge, of which the 
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rural ones were abandoned by the later President Suharto. In Malaysia, as in Thailand 
and Indonesia, the state was involved in so many aspects of life, that a proliferation of 
NGOs to fill up some of that space was very hard. However, in the 1970s, more urban-
oriented organisations emerged, mostly concerned with consumer rights and 
environmental issues.115 Human Rights in this regard remained a controversial issue. In 
Cambodia, however, very few organisations emerged until the 1970, when they started 
playing a crucial role in the channelling of international development aid to the rural 
areas.116 It was especially during the 1980s and 1990s with the economic prosperity that 
NGO proliferation was blooming, especially in the area of development aid. 
International and national NGOs worked together to gain funds and to transfer the aid to 
the areas in most economic need as good as they could. The international non-
governmental organisations were somewhat reserved in directly lobbying with the 
governments in question, which were still a bit suspicious towards external 
interference.117 Therefore, coalitions between international and local organisations, in 
which the locals established and maintained the contacts with the officials, were thought 
to be the most effective means to influence policy. As was the case in Malaysia as well, 
ties with state actors were important to have a chance on political influence.118 
 
When human rights were involved, however, the picture is less roseate. The described 
rise of non-state actors like NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s, is not so much true for those 
working in this field. However, once human rights NGOs are allowed to function, they 
were the best placed of all non-state actors to challenge the authoritarian rule that was 
so dominant in the 1980s and 1990s in Southeast Asia. NGOs provided an opportunity 
and legitimacy to the students, academics to oppose to the governments, as was the case 
in for instance Indonesia.119 And exactly for this reason, these organisations were and in 
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several cases still are heavily restricted by the governments in question. Where claims 
on human rights were repressed in the name of cultural relativism and economic 
development in the past, the argument has shifted, since the terrorist attacks of eleven 
September and the Bali bombings, more towards the justification of the fight against 
terrorism. In the name of protection of internal and regional stability and security the 
freedom of expression and assembly are restricted and opposing “elements”, read: 
representatives of human rights NGOs, are removed from society. This observation can 
be concluded from several Amnesty International reports as well.120 Especially the rise 
of the internet, which is used by many NGOs to spread information on human rights 
violations, has resulted in the further restrictions of the freedom of expression and 
association, which hampers the work of human rights NGOs. They try, through the 
provision of information to create awareness amongst the public and to enforce political 
reform. The niche in which these tasks have to be performed is rather small, however. 
The case of Malaysia shows that NGO influence can be quite effective, as long as the 
formulations used are delicate and aware of the internal governmental fear against too 
much influence and as long as the material used is backed up by political opposition for 
instance. Maintaining a clear division between state and non-state actors, as is done in 
Europe, is not an effective way to improve the human rights situation in Southeast Asia. 
Too clear influence by non-state actors like NGOs is forcefully repressed and leads 
“only” to international indignation. More subtle lobbying, building coalitions with 
opposing political parties, taking careful steps is a more effective way to cultivate 
change. One prerequisite is, of course, that there is a political opposition existent. This 
is rather problematic in the case of Burma/Myanmar. This case, however, is not 
representative or the whole of Southeast Asia, as will be described in the next chapter. 
 
Much has been done, but there is still a long road ahead before these actors can truly 
perform an officially recognized role. This much is clear from the report of the 
International Federation for Human Rights. However, the fact that the amount of NGOs 
has increased noticeably in most countries in Southeast Asia since the 1980s is a sign 
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that slow change is possible. New political leaders like Sasilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 
Indonesia could contribute to this change.121 And these changes are necessary, if the 
region wants to be able to face the challenges it has been facing the last decade, like the 
terrorist attacks, the tsunami and the other earth quakes in Indonesia. These challenges 
can best be faced by an open, transparent, democratic society with respect for human 
rights. As has been said, there is still a long way to go. 
 
4. The case of participation of Burma/Myanmar to the Fifth ASEM Summit 
 
A. The position of the states 
 
The European and East Asian continents committed themselves to develop their 
Dialogue further in the field of political, economic and cultural cooperation. The 
purpose of the ASEM Dialogue was to evolve mutual understanding and respect further 
and to maintain good relations between both parts of the world, based on the principles 
of equality and non-interference in internal matters. Especially the latter principle 
caused friction between both sides, for instance regarding the participation of 
Burma/Myanmar to the Dialogue. This difference of opinion lead to an almost clash 
right before the Fifth ASEM Summit, to be held in Hanoi Vietnam in November 2004. 
This was not the first time, however, that the participation of Burma/Myanmar was a 
topic causing controversy between the Asians and Europeans.  
 
The current military regime has governed with strong force since the military coup in 
1988. At this take-over, the shift of power was only a theoretical one, from one military 
regime to the other. In practice, however, both regimes were intertwined, which resulted 
in the fact that nothing really changed for the population. The grip of the military 
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government of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which assumed 
power of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) ruling from 1962 till 1988, was 
loosened somewhat.122 But still, most of public and private life was fully controlled by 
the military junta, and there was no sign that an independent civil society would be 
allowed to emerge. The maintenance of the government’s control and the resulting 
restrictive laws on several freedoms, such as the freedom of expression, the freedom of 
the press, freedom of association, etc, was subject of more international criticism than 
the BSPP regime, however. The reasons for that were that the international media paid 
more attention to the situation in Burma/Myanmar, also because there now was a clear 
victim of the regime, who personalized the abstract accusations of human rights abuses: 
Aung San Suu Kyi. She is the general secretary of the National League for Democracy 
and received a Nobel Price for her attempts to drive the military regime towards 
democratisation. She was arrested after the student protests in 1988, which were 
bloodily knocked down by junta.123 Since 1989, she is put under house arrest, seriously 
limiting her fundamental human rights and freedoms. Her party, the National League for 
Democracy (NLD) won the 1990 general election decisively, an outcome which was 
ignored by the military leaders, who remained in power.124 Another reason for more 
external criticism on the country was the fact that the world order was changing rapidly 
in those days. The massacre at the Tienanmen Square in Beijing, China by the 
government forces in 1989 was forcefully condemned by the international community, 
which also backfired at the events one year earlier in Burma/Myanmar.  
 
The European Union condemned both the bloodily knocking down of the pro-
democratisation protests, as the ignorance of the election outcomes in 1990. This 
resulted in the political isolation of the country and economic sanctions put on the 
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country by most Western countries. The European Union imposed an arms embargo on 
the country as early as 1990, followed by the ending of defence cooperation in 1991 and 
the suspension of all bilateral aid, except for strictly humanitarian assistance and finally 
a visa ban on all members of the military regime, members of the government and 
senior military officials, etc.125 The United Nations condemned the situation in the 
country through sharply formulated resolutions, of which the first one was adopted by 
the UN Commission of Human Rights in 1989 and after that by the UN General 
Assembly. These resolutions called upon the military junta to hand over power to the 
democratically elected government and to end the human rights violations.126  
 
The ASEAN response, however, was very different: instead of the policy of isolation, 
sanctions, and official condemnation of the human rights situation, the member states of 
the Association chose the policy of “constructive engagement”. This means the effort to 
convince the military regime to come to democratic development by persuasion and 
quiet diplomacy. At the annual summit of ASEAN in Vientiane in 2004, the new Prime 
Minister of Burma/Myanmar, Soe Win was even warmly welcomed by the other 
ASEAN nations, despite the unchanging situation of Aung San Suu Kyi and the lack of 
democratic process.127 They still considered the matter an internal affair of the Burmese 
state, despite the growing humanitarian need, the internal conflict continuing for years 
now, and the grave violations of most civil, political, economic, social and economic 
rights, despite their universal character.128 One important factor in this matter could be 
the position of China on the issue. China is one of the greatest supporters of the military 
regime, because it still keeps the country, which shares a border with the Chinese, 
stable. The Beijing government fears political chaos once the military regime is put out 
of power. And this political chaos could have a spill-over effect on the southern areas of 
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China, because of the Chinese minority living in Burma/Myanmar.129 Besides, China is 
a strong advocate of the non-interference principle. Finally, India has tightened relations 
with Burma/Myanmar, most probable because of interests in the gas reserves in the 
country.130 As the arch-enemy, China cannot stay behind in this matter. Moreover, also 
Thailand has tightened relations with the military junta, possible also out of security 
considerations. The Thai border area is flooded with Burmese refugees, since military 
ruling and since the ethnic conflict in the border areas is continuing.131 The more its 
neighbours will support it, the less likely it is that the international pressure on the 
Burmese military regime will gain effect. 
 
Despite its bad human rights reputation, Burma/Myanmar was adopted in the ASEAN 
system in 1997, which led to a blockade in the relations of the East Asian nations with 
the member states of the European Union. The latter were not willing to enter into a 
dialogue with the military dictatorial regime. The diplomatic relations between both 
regions were deteriorated in such a way, that an ASEAN-EU Joint Cooperation 
Committee was cancelled in November 1997. The same goes for a Senior Official 
Meeting in Bangkok and a meeting between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which was 
planned for March 1999 in Berlin.132 It took another three years until the next EU-
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting could be held in 2000 in Vientiane, Laos. However, 
none of the foreign ministers from the European side participated in this meeting.133 The 
member states of the European Union maintained their position that Burma/Myanmar 
could not attend official Summits, also those of the ASEM Dialogue. This resulted 
almost in the annulment of the Second ASEM Summit in 1998 in London. Through 
mediation by the Thai government, which was the EU-coordinator of ASEAN at that 
moment, the member states of ASEAN decided to finally give in with the proposal that 
ASEAN membership did not automatically lead to ASEM membership. This was a hard 
compromise for the ASEAN states to swallow, since in their view the adoption of 
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Burma/Myanmar in the ASEAN and thus also the ASEM system was a legitimate 
consequence of the policy of constructive engagement.134 However, the Asian states 
were aware of the fact that retaining to the participation of Burma/Myanmar to the 
ASEM Summit would seriously harm the purpose of the Dialogue. In this sense, the 
Asian side decided to give in and participate with only seven ASEAN member states 
plus China, Japan and South-Korea to the Second and the Third Summits in respectively 
London and Seoul. The Fourth Summit was mainly engaged with the issue of 
international terrorism, so there was hardly any room for discussions on human rights 
and participation of Burma/Myanmar, which left the matter still unresolved. The 
question arose again in 2004 in the period towards the Fifth Summit, to be held in 
Hanoi, Vietnam. The European Union was enlarged with ten new member states, which 
were automatically adopted into the ASEM process. This was considered offensive by 
the Asian side, since despite the fact that new member states to the EU have to comply 
with certain standards of good governance and democracy, the reputation in this respect 
of some of the new members can be doubted. 
 
The question that arises here is whether the European states were one in their call to 
boycott the Fifth Summit if Burma/Myanmar would attend on an official level. And 
what exactly was the position of the Asian states in this respect? There was a delegation 
of three states on European side, which were rather strong in their position on the 
position on Burmese participation: the United Kingdom, Denmark and The Netherlands 
were against.135 The Netherlands was in a difficult position in this respect, since it was 
the EU President in the second half that year.136 Therefore, a Special Representative of 
the EU, Dutch former Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek was appointed to negotiate 
with the foreign ministers of Vietnam, as the host country, Japan, Thailand and China, 
as important neighbours. One important factor of these negotiations was that conditions 
are not put in a coercive way, but rather to speak of “wishes” from European side. The 
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wishes as put forward by the Irish Presidency, which was the precedent of the 
Netherlands, were for instance the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all other political 
prisoners, the re-opening of the NLD offices, the continuing of the democratisation 
process and the end of human rights violations in the country.137 The EU Special 
Representative approached China with the request to use its important influence to 
quietly convince the Burmese militaries to move towards democratisation and 
protection of human rights.138 Despite the fact that the appointment of a Special 
Representative, who would discuss the matter bilaterally and not in the official Dialogue 
with all states present, was appreciated by the Beijing minister of foreign affairs, he did 
not respond positively to the request. The position of the minister, and thus the 
government remained that the European Union should not interfere in an internal matter 
of Burma/Myanmar. Multilateral dialogue and the approach of constructive engagement 
were considered by Beijing to be more effective than international isolation. Therefore, 
Burma/Myanmar was supposed to attend to the Summit, at whatever level of 
representation it may decide. According to the Chinese, the European Union delegation 
was too focussed on the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, which was hampering the 
process.139 China did, however, give some “advice” to the military government in which 
the concerns of the international community were filtering through. The question is 
what this advice exactly are. This, however, did not become clear in the interview 
though.  
 
As for Vietnam, this country was in a difficult position, since it was hosting the ASEM 
Summit. Therefore, it had quite an interest in proceeding with the meeting. On the other 
hand, as a member state of ASEAN, it also had an interest in maintaining the principle 
of non-interference and equality. Therefore, at the ministerial meeting of the ASEAN 
Regional Forum, held in Jakarta in the beginning of July, the Vietnamese government 
proposed to the European states the solution of attendance by Burma/Myanmar at the 
ASEM Summit, but not on the presidential level. The Vietnamese made very clear to 
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the European states that this was the absolute bottom line. This position was taken over 
by Japan in the meeting with the Special representative of the EU as well. Japan can be 
considered as one of Asian’s most active members in finding a solution to this problem. 
Japan had a great interest in proceeding with the Summit as well. The official reasons 
for this position remain unclear. Unofficially, however, it could be concluded that Japan 
fears the fast political and economic rise of China. Good relations with the EU could 
always be helpful in countering this rising super power. Therefore, the so-called 
“Jakarta formula” was assented by Tokyo, also as the absolute bottom line.140 If 
Burma/Myanmar could be represented by a delegation with a lower rank than minister 
of foreign affairs, international criticism on its policy would have no effect. 
International criticism on its human rights policy and its lack of democratisation could 
be helpful, according to Tokyo. However, it was important to keep in mind that the 
internal political situation in Burma/Myanmar was an issue separately from the ASEM 
Dialogue. Therefore, too much emphasis on the release of Aung San Suu Kyi would be 
counterproductive. The timing for the release was a Burmese matter.141 These latter 
arguments made by the Japanese minister of foreign affairs could be interpreted as a 
disguised approval of the non-interference principle, as supported heavily by the Asian 
side. In other words, the Japanese made clear to the EU that it had to step aside. Instead 
of focussing on the negative aspects, Europe should focus on East Asia in an economic 
respect, as the most dynamic region in the world nowadays, according to the Japanese 
minister.  
 
Finally, the Special Representative met the minister of foreign affairs of Thailand. The 
Thai position in the matter of participation of Burma/Myanmar was somewhat delicate. 
On the one hand, the Thai government was approaching the Burmese military junta 
more and more in the last year, as was described above. On the other hand, the Thai 
government was disappointed and worried about the unwilling position of the Burmese. 
In December 2003 Bangkok hosted a forum on the future of Burma/Myanmar. The 
conference was meant to be a meeting of like-minded nations, together with UN special 
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envoy Razali Ismail.142 The Burmese minister of foreign affairs Win Aung outlined the 
roadmap of the Prime Minister Gen Khin Nyunt, which includes seven steps towards 
democratisation.143 The second meeting of the Bangkok Process was scheduled for 
April 2004. The Burmese leadership decided not to attend this second round of talks, 
possibly because the hard-line top of the military regime had taken over the national 
reconciliation process from the more moderate Prime Minister Khin Nyunt.144 This was 
not only detrimental for the states attending the process, but especially for the Thai 
government, initiating and hosting the meetings. On the other hand, the Thai 
government was rather strict in supporting the ASEAN plus three construction attending 
the ASEM Summit: either all new member states of the European ànd the Asian would 
attend or none of the new member states could participate.145 The “Jakarta formula” was 
not considered a very good option by Bangkok. If this would have to be the solution 
than indeed, the ministers level would be the absolute bottom line. 
 
It is clear from the above that the Asian states were struggling with maintaining good 
relations with their European counterparts on the one hand, and supporting the principle 
of non-interference and maintaining regional stability on the other hand. Some Asian 
states were more firm than others. On the European side, however, there was no full 
consensus on the matter either. As described, there was a coalition of Great Britain, 
Denmark and The Netherlands on the one hand, in favour of boycotting the Summit, 
and there was mainly France on the other hand, declaring to proceed with the meeting. 
The reasons for this French position can be sought in the area of economic interests. At 
least that is what the Burma Campaign UK is stating in its report on the role of the oil 
firm Total in Burma/Myanmar.146 Besides, on the EU level, the boycott of investments 
in the Asian country was negotiated.147 France declared to be against such sanctions.148 
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Moreover, the EU was negotiating the ban on import of teak wood from 
Burma/Myanmar into the Union. The problem with this ban would be, however, that it 
is against the regulations of the World Trade Organization.  
 
In all, the European Union member states had trouble finding consensus in the matter. 
France was the most prominent state against the boycott of the Summit. The 
Netherlands was in a difficult position, but declared itself to be against the political 
situation in the Asian country, while Germany and Austria were struggling with the fact 
that they did not want to offend the other Asian nations.149 Eventually, the agreement 
was to follow the Jakarta formula and allow the Burmese minister of foreign affairs to 
attend the Summit. This was considered to be the best possible, but still temporary 
solution. The issue had to be solved, since Burma/Myanmar was supposed to be the 
President of ASEAN in 2006. The United States of America had, unofficially, declared 
not to attend the Asia Regional Forum Meeting, because of the reputation of 
Burma/Myanmar. Finally, on July 26, Burma/Myanmar decided to abandon the 
possibility of performing the Presidency of ASEAN.150 The declared reason was that the 
country would be too occupied with the democratic reform process, since 2006 would 
be a critical year for the implementation of the roadmap to democratisation.151 Some 
opponents to the military regime welcome the decision by the junta, while other critics 
state that this way the military regime has taken the easy way out. The government 
might argument that it has given in to some of the international demands already, so it 
does not have to do more regarding the democratisation process and the protection of 
human rights. Whether the Burmese government will use this decision as a first step 
towards a more liberal and democratic system remains to be seen. Fact is that a crisis 
between the EU and the USA on the one hand and the member states of ASEAN on the 
issue is diverted, at least for now. 
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B. The role of non-state actors in the Burma case 
 
The issue of participation of Burma/Myanmar to the Fifth ASEM Summit was mainly a 
matter between state officials. International NGOs with the help of the international 
media, however, have put the issue on the international agenda. Among European 
NGOs, there is a quite some interest in working in and on the human rights and 
development situation in the country. The spread of information is crucial in respect of 
international attention and pressure on the military regime. This is one of the main 
reasons why the current military regime is been dealt with internationally so much since 
its existence, while its predecessor the Burma Socialist Program Party was not under 
international attention so much. Globally, there are several Burma advocacy centres, 
which perform an important role in the spread of information: nine in European 
countries, the US, Canada, Japan and Australia.152 They try to bring about change in the 
country through human rights advocacy. In order to get important information, 
cooperation with local NGOs is sought. Under the military regime of BSPP, which ruled 
from 1962 till 1988, civil society, within the terms as we know it, was nearly absent. 
When the SLORC regime came into force in 1988, economic liberalisation was 
promoted, including the private sector. This came to an abrupt end, however, in 1990 
with the general elections, won so convincing by the opposition. From that moment, 
state control tightened and the private and non-governmental organisations were 
reduced to those, which were independent but not allowed official accreditation, and 
those heavily controlled by the state. Besides, there are up to roughly twenty NGOs, 
mostly Christian and Muslim, working in the border areas on giving aid to the 
refugees.153 The accreditation is a means used by the government to maintain control 
over the international NGOs willing to work in Burma/Myanmar. In order for these 
foreign NGOs willing to operate within the country itself, an agreement with the 
government has to be closed. These agreements, the so-called Memorandums of 
Understanding, are only obtained after a bureaucratic negotiation process with the 
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ministry in question. The organisation applying for the agreement has to be permitted a 
residence in the country.154 The residence permit is usually followed by a period of 
delay, in which the government screens the organization. Then, the negotiation process 
with the ministry takes place before the request is finally approved by the special 
committee.155 The entire procedure is a clear example of state control. This is the reason 
why Aung San Suu Kyi called for the international NGOs not to operate from within 
Burma/Myanmar, because they would be too dependant on government’s scrutiny, or 
even worse: they would be used by the government’s propaganda machine and 
development would not reach those who need it the most. The question that makes it 
very difficult to stay away for many international human rights and development NGOs 
is, however, what to do with the worsening humanitarian situation the population is in. 
Should they just be left on their own? Some NGOs have answered this question 
negatively, arguing that the humanitarian crisis that is going on in the country has to be 
stopped. In order to do that, these NGOs have subjected themselves to the government 
regime. Some of these have established ties with government-organised NGOs, the so-
called GONGOs, which are most of the national NGOs in Burma/Myanmar. These 
bodies were set up by the government mainly for welfare purposes and their agenda is 
heavily influenced by the military government.156 Other international NGOs, however, 
have remained independent and they meet a lot of opposition and obstruction by the 
military junta, in the form of stealing of development aid, very restrictive laws and 
additional conditions for their functioning in the country. Because of these obstructions, 
these international NGOs have always been reluctant to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi’s 
National League for Democracy, despite several requests from her side to have an open 
dialogue on the required changes and the role of the international NGOs in cranking up 
these changes. According to the NLD, international NGOs should not operate from 
within Burma/Myanmar, until the political climate has changed sufficiently to allow 
their independent functioning.157 This reasoning could be rebutted by the argument that 
(international) NGOs probably play a crucial role in establishing this political change. 
Despite the fact that the best way to encourage the process of liberalisation and 
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democratisation is if it comes from inside, the situation under the strict control by the 
SLORC regime is not likely to change soon. Therefore, a combination between internal 
movement and international pressure must be used to get the process started. 
International and national NGOs should further combine forces to mobilize people for 
social change. The struggle of the Burmese people for more protection and respect of 
human rights has gained an international character already by the attention given to it by 
the international media in the late 1980s. Change will not be reached on a state level, 
where there are once again too many other interests at stake, and the Burmese military 
junta has often proven to be an unreliable negotiation partner, without any intention of 
social and political reform. Both approaches of sanctions and constructive engagement 
have not led to the required reform either. In that sense, Aung San Suu Kyi is right in 
stating that the reform has to come from within; it cannot be forced upon the Burmese 
from the outside. Therefore, the change has to come from the people themselves, 
facilitated by the independent NGOs, through the secretively spread of information, 
human rights advocacy, humanitarian aid and the creation of public awareness. 
Hopefully, the people of Burma/Myanmar have not become numb towards the political, 
social and especially humanitarian situation they are in, which might be the worst 
barrier for social change. Important on an international level is, however, to keep the 
situation in the Asian country on the international agenda, if anything is ever going to be 
achieved in this regard. And especially in this matter, national and international (human 
rights) NGOs can use their influence to show their importance. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The ASEM Dialogue is a multilateral forum, in which negotiations take place between 
more than two parties. Because of its informal structure, and the Asian interest in 
dealing with important matters informally and bilaterally, the Dialogue is not a 
traditional negotiation process, in which parties sit around the negotiation table 
discussing matters of concern. The Dialogue is much more a format characterized by the 
whole process besides the plenary discussion, in which important issues are being 
discussed in the coulisses. The appreciation of the Chinese government of the 
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appointment of the Special Representative of the EU to deal with the issue of 
Burma/Myanmar bilaterally is a good example of this.  
 
Despite its informal character, this informality has not resulted in a acceptance of non-
state actors in the Dialogue yet: ASEM is still fully dominated by state parties. Non-
state parties, like NGOs have tried to set up parallel meetings, discussing the main 
themes of the official meeting. Special unofficial meetings have been held on the issue 
of human rights as well. These unofficial meetings have met quite some resistance of 
mainly the Asian states. Vietnam, as the host country, tried to prevent the parallel NGO 
meeting from taking place by requesting high conditions for NGOs for registration, 
restricting the amount of locations where the parallel meeting could take place, etc. 
Especially Asian NGOs have made clear that they have trouble in raising matters, which 
were considered to be critical to their Asian governments. Despite the fact that the 
situation in most Southeast Asian nations shows an increase in the amount and 
effectiveness of NGOs, the process of change in this regard is still very slow. Through 
the ASEM Dialogue, they hope to increase their influence in the Asian region, with the 
help of the European states and non-state actors. In this respect, the Dialogue serves as a 
legitimization of the will of the Asian NGOs to increase their role in national policy 
making. The cooperation or at least the dialogue with European counterparts is part of 
this legitimization. On the other hand, cooperation between Asian and European NGOs 
also serves the latter rather well. The reason is that international (read in this respect: 
European) NGOs meet criticism regarding their legitimacy, since the Asian 
governments argue that these organizations are mainly Western based, protecting the 
Western, individualistically oriented values and norms. These values and norms cannot 
be applied to the Asian states, which are more paternalistic and community based. 
Therefore, the influence of the NGOs proclaiming these values should be limited as 
well. Cooperation with Asian organisations, which do set more “Asian-like” norms 
could contradict this argumentation.  
 
Asian leaders use the same position to invalidate the practical application of the 
universality of human rights. As long as the issue of human rights is considered to be an 
 64 
internal matter, other states do not have to act once violations occur and they will not be 
criticised themselves for their policy either. Looking at the true meaning of the 
universality of human rights, however, as gained by those rights that were inserted in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this term includes the obligation upon 
every state to act to protect human rights everywhere for everyone. Whether a society is 
community or individually based is not an issue here. Several Asian states are still 
hiding behind this argumentation in order not to be criticised themselves on their own 
policy. It is advisable that Asian states recognize the importance of human rights 
protection, not only on paper, but in practice as well. The same goes for the existence 
and influence of non-state actors. Especially regarding the protection of human rights, 
these non-state actors have an important role to fulfil. Putting an issue on the 
international agenda, as has been done in the case of Burma/Myanmar after 1988, 
lobbying, human rights advocacy, provision of information and technical knowledge 
and assistance, norm setting, etc, are all functions which are valuable to increase the 
level of human rights protection in a certain area. NGOs should use the powerful 
mechanism of “naming and shaming” to pressure states to cooperate with a certain 
action, treaty or body. The negotiation process of the International Criminal Court has 
shown that NGOs can be rather successful in using the means of pressure. However, the 
success of NGOs in the negotiation process towards the establishment of the ICC can 
result in two opposing trends: either states are forced to recognize the role of NGOs on a 
more permanent basis, or states have learned their lesson of allowing NGOs at the 
official process and they will, from now on, be more reluctant in this respect. Which 
ever it will be, it is hard to tell at this moment. The fact is that several Asian states fear 
the influence of these non-state actors and, therefore, they have a policy of restricting 
NGO presence and influence.  
 
In the case of Burma/Myanmar, the fact that NGOs have used the international media to 
put the issue of its violent regime under international attention has at least resulted in 
the discussion of the matter on a state level, also in the ASEM Dialogue. In the case of 
the military regime in the Southeast Asian country, this is the most visible and effective 
role that non-state actors can play: maintaining the matter on the international agenda 
and providing the required information, forcing other states to act or at least condemn 
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the regime. This has lead to a sanction regime put on the country by amongst others the 
European Union and the United States of America. In the country itself, where the space 
for non-state actors to arise is very limited, it is very hard for NGOs to further use their 
influence to improve the level of human rights protection. However, in 
Burma/Myanmar, as in other Southeast Asian countries, international NGOs cooperate 
with local NGOs to increase their possibility to influence the policies of the 
government. Moreover, coalitions with states have appeared to be influential. The ideal 
world order would be one, in which state and non-state actors are not opponents, but are 
equal to each other, cooperating on matters such as human rights. Non-state actors like 
NGOs have important roles to fulfil, which are complementary to those of states. 
Coalitions between states and NGOs fit very well in this picture. It is needless to say, 
however, that we are still nowhere near this situation.  
 
A step in the direction of more equal cooperation between states and NGOs in the 
ASEM Dialogue would be if European states would take up this suggestion. The matter 
of human rights dialogue between the ASEM states initiated on a governmental level is 
rather stuck. On a state level, difference in interpretation of human rights norms, the 
principle of non-interference and the fear against Western (post-colonial) domination 
are causes for mistrust between both “sides”, as are differences of opinion on the 
realization of cooperation between both regions. Therefore, if European states want to 
discuss matters of human rights with their Asian counterparts, the way to do so is 
through the non-governmental organisations. Despite the fact that Asian states are rather 
reluctant to allow NGOs to attend the official negotiation process, the situation in 
Southeast Asia on the influence of NGOs on government policy has slowly shown a 
shift. Therefore, the chance that non-state actors will be accepted at the negotiation table 
and using their influence, which is considerable as was shown by the examples of 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, is larger than the chance that the issue 
of human rights will be accepted by Asian states as an official part of the Dialogue 
when it is initiated by their European counterparts. Those European states wanting to 
discuss human rights should in this respect let the NGOs do the “dirty work” in 
lobbying for the issue and using their “naming and shaming” strategy to have the matter 
discussed. The question that arises here is whether, studying the case of 
 66 
Burma/Myanmar, the discussion of human rights protection on a state level in the 
ASEM Dialogue will actually result in more protection as well. The Burma/Myanmar 
case is a traditional case of state domination and isolation, violating human rights in 
every possible way, being almost impervious towards international pressure and 
allowing hardly any possibility for improvement of the situation in the near future. The 
only sign that could be interpreted positively is the abandonment of the military junta of 
the ASEAN presidency in 2006. Does international state pressure with the assistance of 
international and regional NGOs finally have some grip on the Burmese militaries? 
 
Fact remains that true change towards more human rights protection should come from 
the inside, with assistance from the outside, and not the other way around. Only this 
way, change will be sustainable. This internal process should be initiated by non-state 
actors and finally be taken over by official government policy. The ASEM Dialogue 
could set this internal process in motion, but only with the focus of European states on 
the Asian non-state organisations. Hopefully, the Europeans are willing to take up this 
role.  
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